*Inaugural Issue*
# Redefining Diplomacy

## by Clay Constantinou

In recent years, we have witnessed a remarkable evolution in the world of diplomacy. This evolution reflects the many new possibilities for cooperation that have arisen since the end of the cold war. It also reflects the increasing interdependence of a world linked by the growth of trade and the revolution in information technology.

The new paradigm consists of changes in the form of diplomacy, the scope of issues it addresses, and the identity of its participants. Increasingly, multilateral diplomacy is supplanting the traditional bilateral approach. Issues such as security, trade, human rights, and the environment are now routinely addressed by the world community in a collective fashion.

Equally remarkable is the expanding role of intergovernmental organizations in the diplomatic arena. The United Nations, for example, has in recent years exercised its peacekeeping and enforcement powers with greater frequency to restrain armed conflicts and to achieve humanitarian ends. At the same time, the European Union has taken historic steps to deepen its institutions and widen its membership.

Nonstate actors are also playing significant roles in this new era. Nongovernmental organizations are participating in multilateral negotiations and in the operation of international agencies. In the private sector, international business actively helps develop international product standards and codes of conduct.

While these developments have opened a whole new era of diplomatic opportunity and promise, new challenges and complications have also arisen. The period immediately after the end of the cold war was one of optimism and great expectations. Some problems, however, proved to be more intractable than earlier anticipated. Adding to the complexity are the many new constituencies seeking participation at the international bargaining table.

To address the opportunities of the new diplomacy and the challenges it presents, we are pleased to introduce the *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations.* In the *Journal* we shall present the views and insights of international leaders, policymakers, and scholars. We shall also seek views of those who are active in nontraditional approaches, including nongovernmental organizations and business. We trust that the *Journal* will contribute to a better understanding of today's global environment, at the same time suggesting solutions to the common problems the world faces.

---

**Amb. Clay Constantinou** (**Ret.**) is dean of the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University.

*Addressing the Future*

# High-Tech and High-Touch

## by Crown Princess Maria Teresa of Luxembourg

> *Crown Princess Maria Teresa of Luxembourg was born in Havana, Cuba. She graduated with a degree in political science from the University of Geneva in 1980. It was there that she met Crown Prince Henri, whom she married in 1981. In June 1997, she was named a Goodwill Ambassador of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), where her work has focused on child protection and poverty alleviation. She addressed the Seton Hall University community on October 19, 1999.*

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights says that every person has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing, medical care, and the necessary social services: the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age, or other lack of livelihood or circumstances beyond his control. The declaration also asks the state to ensure effective application of these rights.

Throughout my university years in Geneva, many theories were unsatisfying to me. One of my main concerns as a student of political science was our continued acceptance of the fact that some countries become richer and others poorer. Of great consolation to me was that specialized institutions and agencies, international ones as well as multilateral and bilateral ones, are busy in this field. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have decided that both institutions will cooperate in the fight against poverty and corruption. A new international architecture for development, based on macroeconomic, social, and structural programs, is being organized in order to help less developed countries. Bilateral efforts are developing, although the UN recommendation aiming at a flow of 0.70% of GDP from the developed countries to the less developed ones is put into practice by a very small number of states only. I am pleased to say that the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg is entering this leading group with its year 2000 budget.

When I became a goodwill ambassador to UNESCO, the director-general, Frederico Mayor, asked me what cause I would be willing to serve. I answered him that my main interest would be helping those who suffer in developing countries. He then suggested that I visit a great friend of his in Bangladesh, Professor Mohammed Yunus, the so-called friend of the poor. A few months later, I arrived in Dhaka for one of the most impressive experiences of my life. I would like to share this experience with you.

Professor Yunus lives in one of the poorest countries of the world, Bangladesh: cyclones, floods, and droughts have devastated much of the country. On a regular basis, 40% of the Bangladeshi people cannot satisfy the minimum need of food per day. Malnutrition is part of daily life in Bangladesh. There is a population density of 830 inhabitants per square kilometer. To compare to Europe, this would mean squeezing into the territory of Bavaria the population of Great Britain, France, and Ireland. Illiteracy affects 90% of the population. One might wonder how, in this climate, Bangladesh would be able to help the rest of the world. But in fact, we are witnessing today an unprecedented transfer of assistance through the country's Grameen Bank, in the form of microcredits, from Bangladesh towards other countries. This program is nothing less than a way to make poverty disappear from the planet forever.

In 1974, the year of the terrible drought, Professor Yunus, teaching economics at Dhaka University, walked in the streets and saw his people dying. This made the professor realize that although the economic theories he was teaching had elaborate solutions in the classroom, hundreds of thousands of people were starving to death on the streets outside. He then took one of the major decisions of his life: his university was going to become the village next door, his teachers the poor people, and he would be the student, to find out why his teaching did not correspond to reality. What was the real-life economy that a poor person confronted in everyday life?

One day, the professor entered the house of a poor woman making a bamboo stool. The woman earned two cents a day; I think it is difficult for us to imagine her condition. When the professor asked her why her revenue was so low, she explained that the only person who would lend her money to buy bamboo was the trader who purchased her final product, and the price he set barely covered the costs. The professor's instinct was to open his wallet and to give her some money; I think all of us would have reacted in the same way. But then he thought: why not give her a loan? This moment is a key moment, in my opinion, in the history of microcredit. The reaction of wanting to give immediately is a double-edged sword, as they say in French. On the one hand, you give in order to help a person, and on the other hand, you give because you want to quiet your conscience. I think it was very courageous of Professor Yunus to go much further than that, and to abstain from quieting his conscience too quickly, which is one of the biggest defects in our countries, namely, giving immediately without thinking of the consequences. He took time to reconsider and to see what long-lasting help he might be able to offer.

The idea of the loan gave birth to a remarkable institution, the Grameen Bank. Today, Grameen Bank is considered the most successful self-sustaining, antipoverty program in the world. It has more than 2 million borrowers, 94% of whom are women. And it has been replicated throughout the world, including in locations across the United States and Canada.

Since its independence in 1971, Bangladesh was receiving billions of dollars in foreign aid and had seen the majority of its citizens grow poorer. Against this backdrop, the founder of Grameen Bank reversed the conventional development approach: in his view, development has to begin with the country's poorest citizens. In Bangladesh, this means women. In two decades, experience has shown that miracle cures are not required to alleviate poverty. Instead, poverty can be addressed through innovative institutions that demonstrate faith in, and respect for, the people.

## Poverty can be addressed through innovative institutions that demonstrate faith in, and respect for, the people.

I would like to tell you more about my visit, two years ago, in Bangladesh. I was very privileged to meet Professor Yunus, and he took me to one of the villages on the outskirts of Dhaka. He introduced me to a group of women who, for different reasons, has been sent away from their homes and had to face life on their own with their children. One of these women told me her story, so I'd just like to share it with you. "Well, you see," she said, "when I was about thirteen, my father married me off to a man who was a very good person. I had five children with him. A few years after we'd married, he decided that he would take another wife." So, he took another wife and the second wife did not accept this young girl with whom I spoke. She was thrown out of the house and sent away with her children back to her father's house. Then came the drought and no one could assume the responsibility for feeding her and her children, and she was left alone on the street. She told me her story with great dignity, without a moment of self-pity. The only moment when I saw tears in her eyes was when she spoke of the drought: "I saw my children hunger." There were tears in her eyes, besides the fact that there were tears in mine too. And then she went on: "I had to find a way to survive, for my children and myself. I went to the closest village and found a group of women, who were setting up together a little microcredit enterprise. And I asked them if I could join. That group did not take me, but another group in the village did. And thanks to them, today, I have my own house and feed my children, and have everything for my children and for myself." I was very, very touched. And I hugged her and said to her: "It's extraordinary. Thank you for telling me your story." And she looked at me and she said: "Little sister, what I didn't tell you is that out of my five children, three are deaf and dumb."

So, Professor Yunus began building his bank by rejecting the age-old notion that poor people are not creditworthy. If banks couldn't figure out how to deal with the poor, then they weren't "people-worthy," to quote the professor. Today, his system for extending small loans to women in thousands of villages has won praise around the

world. Tackling the fight against poverty with a market approach has enabled millions of individuals to get out of the poverty cycle with dignity. Restoring dignity, helping people to become stronger and to restore their self-esteem, are key words in the microcredit program. Microcredit means exactly what the word says: a very small credit that is supposed to be reimbursed when the debtor is ready to do so. This is quite different from a grant. Being given money by a donator, who does not even consider the possibility that you might be able to reimburse him, and accepting the same amount under the understanding that you are going to reimburse it over a given period of time creates quite a different relationship and a different responsibility. It's the difference between borrowing and asking for alms. It makes a different person out of you, in your own understanding and in the understanding of your surroundings.

I think that the most fundamental change brought about by microcredits is the social change that happens to be connected with gender in many developing countries. The role of women is undergoing considerable change, because we must realize that in those parts of the world, to the contrary of the situation in our countries, women do not have access to education at all. And the fact of empowering them, giving them the responsibility of a certain amount of money and giving them control over their own lives and their future, brings along all sorts of other consequences and notions of education: the mere fact of learning how to count, the mere fact of learning how to sign one's name. And it has tremendous political consequences. For example, in Bangladesh, Professor Yunus informed the women, who make up 90% of the people who receive the loans, that they had the right to vote. They were very grateful, and they wondered whom they were going to vote for. Well, Professor Yunus told them: vote for whomever you consider the best person to represent your interests, to help you in your life. So, they went to vote and the outcome of that voting was that the extreme Muslim party lost the majority of seats it had previously in Parliament. The outcome was very, very impressive to the population in Bangladesh, and it demonstrated that the vote of women must be taken into account.

I must now note that the repayment rate of loans made by the Grameen Bank is higher than 90%. Whereas in the beginning of this movement, traditional bankers believed that the money would never be paid back, it has become a fact that out of dignity and respect for themselves and because people show confidence in themselves, those who receive these loans are much better at paying them back and they do so quicker than many of us in the developed world. There is also the factor that in developing societies, women have a special role as multipliers. There is a Sikh saying that's very nice: "If you educate a boy, you educate one person. If you educate a girl, you educate a family." And this is true: the personal progress made by women in educational, sanitary, and humanitarian matters is immediately transferred to the younger generation, whose starting point integrates that progress.

I would like to finish by mentioning that cultural change too comes along with microcredit. Connecting a developing society to a broader economy, and making it permeable to the exchanges brought about by an open market, is not a new initiative. But true progress lies in the capacity of the society to respect also its memory, its

traditions, its specificity, combined with today's creativity. And microcredit has been playing an important role in keeping alive and in renewing cultural heritage. At UNESCO, we started a project that's called "Fashion for Development," which involves fashion shows that present fabrics and models made by people in developing parts of the world. There have been very big fashion shows put up at the UNESCO building in Paris with tremendous success.

There is another aspect to microcredit that depends a lot on you, the younger generation. If these programs are to be successful in the long term, we have to find them new markets. The market possibilities are still very strained, so helping people in their countries to get started is very important. We are reaching this objective little by little in different continents, but establishing a connection between their market and our markets and respecting simultaneously their products is much more difficult.

## Students of today should make this world one where globalization and diversity share equal rights.

And then again, we must not forget that everything does not necessarily go our way. The way of working people in the Third World countries is very often based on arts and crafts. And these are capacities that cannot finish up in a museum, just because of globalization and macroeconomy. I think that in our world of high-tech, we can also have high-touch, as Frederico Mayor likes to say. There is a place for globality, there is a place for very large market exchanges, but there is also a place for the human touch, there is also a demand for slower, quality work. It's a question of informing people that the products are available. But people are ready to pay the price for a beautiful fabric made in India, in Nepal, or in Bangladesh, even if it is a bit more expensive. Everything doesn't have to be industrialized on a big scale. So, it depends on us and it depends especially on you, the students of today, to make this world one where globalization and diversity share equal rights, where cultural memory is the nest of the global vision, where high-tech and high-touch can live together. Because the common denominator of it all is, after all, the human being.

You, the students of Seton Hall University, should always remember whom you are serving in everything that you are doing, here and later on during your life. Put the human being at the center of all your preoccupations and nothing else. If you focus on that, you can't really go wrong.

*Addressing the Future*

# Impediments to the Solution of the Cyprus Problem

by Glafcos Clerides

*Glafcos Clerides was born in Nicosia, Cyprus, in 1919. He volunteered for the British Royal Air Force in World War II. After his airplane was shot down over Germany in 1942, he remained a prisoner until the end of the war. He received his L.L.B. degree from King's College, University of London, in 1948. Among the positions he has held are president of the Cyprus Red Cross, leader of the Democratic Rally Party, and head of numerous delegations addressing the Cyprus problem. He was elected president of the Republic of Cyprus in 1993 and reelected in 1998. He addressed the Seton Hall University community on September 24, 1999.*

At the outset, I would like to say to the students of the School of Diplomacy who I met today—don't be disappointed because you will hear how difficult it is to solve a simple problem.

In order to grasp the meaning and the difficulties we face in trying to solve the Cyprus problem, I should give you a very short background of how it came about. Then I will tell you about the situation: the difficulties that were created by military operations and by the invasion of Cyprus. And finally, I will try to give you my feelings about the future and how the problem could be solved.

Cyprus has a very strategic position in the eastern Mediterranean. Most nations from Europe who wanted to conquer Africa or Asia stepped over Cyprus, and most Asian nations who wanted to conquer European countries, again, stepped over Cyprus. And despite all this, the people of Cyprus maintained their language, their culture, and their religion.

Cyprus was a part of the Ottoman Empire, and therefore we have a Turkish community that constitutes 18% of the population of the island; 82% are Greek Cypriots, and there are some Maronites, and some Armenians, among others. In 1955, after a long but unsuccessful struggle to attain their freedom by peaceful means, the people of Cyprus took up arms against the colonial power. The British government, in its attempt to thwart the Cyprus people's aspirations for self-determination, exploited the presence in Cyprus of the Turkish Cypriot minority. Therefore, it sought assistance from Turkey with a view to obstructing the natural trend of events in Cyprus. The Turkish government accepted the invitation to intervene in Cyprus, in defiance of its solemn undertaking under the Treaty of Lausanne, and a section of the

Turkish Cypriot minority in Cyprus became the instrument both of British colonialism and of a new expansionist tendency in Turkey.

The British government threatened that if self-determination were ever to be achieved in Cyprus, it would result in the partition of the island since the Turkish Cypriot minority would be offered the right to self-determination separately. That threat might have been intended to discourage the Cypriot people's struggle for freedom, but its consequences were quite different than expected. Instead, the partition of Cyprus became the objective of Turkish foreign policy, and a number of Turkish Cypriots took up arms against the Cypriot freedom fighters, while the Turkish Cypriot leadership advocated either partition or the continuation of British colonial rule.

A compromise was reached in 1959 when a solution was found by the Zurich and London agreements by which we have become an independent country, with two communities and of course with British military bases. The London-Zurich agreement resulted in an inflexible constitution, which caused considerable trouble in the first years of our independence. In addition, there were many so-called guarantees. That is to say, Britain, Greece, and Turkey were to guarantee the independence, the territorial integrity, and the constitutional order of the Republic of Cyprus. Under those guarantees, the basic articles of the constitution—which were about thirty-six—could not be amended (even if both communities agreed) without the consent of the guarantor powers.

In 1963, the situation between the two communities became quite tense because of the inflexibility of the constitution, and fighting broke out. There have been numerous Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, calling on all countries to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, and also calling upon the two communities to negotiate the settlement of the constitutional differences. Unfortunately, in 1974, while Greece was under military rule, it decided to launch a coup. Turkey used these events as a pretext to invade Cyprus—not to restore the constitution, not to protect the territory and integrity of Cyprus, not to maintain the unity of the country, but for the purpose of pushing the Greek Cypriot population from the north to the south, making them refugees in their own country. They then tried to change the demographic composition of the northern part of Cyprus by importing settlers from Turkey.

## Two young generations are growing up not as compatriots and neighbors but as potential enemies.

Now, this happened in 1974, and since then it has not been possible to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. Let me just enumerate the complications that were created by the Turkish invasion and the continued occupation of 37% of the Mediterranean isle. Aside from the fact that 180,000 Cypriots are kept away from their homes and their properties; aside from the transplanting of settlers and the change in the demography and composition of the northern part of Cyprus, the conflict between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots has become completely benign, so to speak,

by having an occupation force of 35,000 Turkish troops, which do not allow the Greek Cypriots to go north and meet the Turkish Cypriots or vice versa. So we are getting two young generations, of Greek Cypriots and of Turkish Cypriots, growing up not as compatriots and neighbors but as potential enemies. Another concern is the difference in the per capita income of the two sides. That is to say, in the occupied north, the per capita income is about $4,000 per annum; in the south, it is $15,000.

Moreover, because of the presence of the Turkish forces in the north, we found it necessary in the south to create another army—the National Guard, the army of the Greek Cypriots—and to make an alliance with Greece for the defense of the southern part of Cyprus. These military forces face each other in the middle of the island, and there is a peacekeeping force of the United Nations in the middle, which tries to prevent incidents from escalating and sucking in the whole armies of the two sides, plus Greece and Turkey. It is therefore imperative, not only from the point of view of the Cypriots, Greeks, and Turks, but also for the stability in the region, that we find a solution whereby this confrontation ceases to exist—Cyprus becomes demilitarized and, in order to build confidence between the two communities, we have an international force, authorized by the Security Council, to intervene if either of the two communities were to adopt plans that put in danger the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the federation and of the agreements reached.

Now, the compromise that the international community saw as a possible solution was that Cyprus should be an independent, sovereign federal republic. And that it should have one single sovereignty, one single international personality, that it should not be allowed to join either Greece or Turkey, and that secession would be prohibited. We have tried several times to find a solution within that context, but unfortunately the Turkish side, led by the Turkish Cypriot leader Mr. Rauf Denktash, insists on two separate sovereign states, and demands that this recognition of two separate sovereign states must actually occur even before we sit at the negotiating table. Mr. Denktash refuses to come to the negotiating table until such time as we give in to these demands.

I believe that if we are going to find a solution to the Cyprus problem, the first thing we want is a change of mentality. We must not—either the one or the other community—repeat mistakes of the past; mistakes have been committed by both communities. Now let me tell you that we are prepared to sit at the negotiating table and talk with Mr. Denktash, who will represent the Turkish Cypriot community, in a spirit of good will, and in a spirit of understanding of their problems, of their difficul-

ties, and that we wish to help them, to raise their per capita income, while at the same time securing for them the rights which all citizens will have. In addition, we will grant them extraordinary rights insofar as the matters of internal administration are concerned, retaining for them the maximum degree of self-administration on internal matters. We also want to invite them to join with us in the European Union, because within the context of the European Union both communities will prosper and it should pacify all their anxieties.

What are these anxieties? Let us outline them. Let us not attempt to examine whether they are reasonable or unreasonable. We must look upon them as real anxieties of the people of Cyprus, whether they are Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots fear that we, the Greek Cypriots, being the majority in the island, will one day overrun the island and reduce them to second-class citizens and unite the island with Greece, which I do not want, or make a second Greek state or something close to that.

What are the anxieties of the Greek Cypriots? That Turkey, using the Turkish community as a pretext, will one day expand and occupy the whole of the island. Now, joining the European Union should pacify both communities that their fears would not become a reality, because neither the Greek Cypriots would be allowed to overrun the Turkish community and reduce its members to second-class citizens, nor would Turkey be allowed to invade the south and occupy the whole of Cyprus. As such, if we have the guarantee that there would be an international force in Cyprus, which would have the right, by the authority of the Security Council, to intervene and prevent the one community from putting in danger the other community or violating the terms of the agreements, I think that this would be sufficient. With a sovereign state with one international personality, with one citizenship, and also de-militarized, we should be able to find a solution that would satisfy the legitimate interests of both communities.

## Instead of localizing tension, the current pattern tends to export it to Greece and Turkey.

It is important also to avoid having the presence of Greek and Turkish forces on the island. Past experience has shown that those forces take on a central role, where chauvinistic nationalistic elements of both communities create problems. And it is equally important that both Greece and Turkey will continue with the United Kingdom to be guarantors. There should be additional guarantors, however, because if there is tension between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, the Greeks side with the Greek Cypriots, the Turks side with the Turkish Cypriots, and the British remain in the middle without wanting to do anything. And, instead of localizing the tension, this pattern tends to export tensions to Greece and Turkey, creating conflicts between two countries of the NATO alliance.

If there is going to be a breakthrough for the solution of the Cyprus problem, it will greatly depend on the international community: what pressure it would exercise

to bring the two sides to the negotiating table and to help them find a solution to the problem. It is of vital importance that the international community play a role. At this moment, there is an increased interest in Cyprus from the international community. The G-8 issued a statement calling upon the two sides to come to the negotiations without preconditions. We had the same statement from the Security Council of the United Nations. We had a similar statement from the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as a statement from the European Union along the same lines. So there is an international interest to see a solution to the Cyprus problem and to see the process of unification become a reality. But the international community must go beyond just expressing. It must deepen understanding that the side that refuses to follow the views of the international community will face some consequences. Otherwise, the prospects of a solution of the Cyprus problem, or of moving towards a solution, will be very slim.

## The side that refuses to follow the international community's views must face some consequences.

Before I leave this podium, I would like to say that there is something that came out of immense catastrophe, and it is regrettable that it should be so. The devastating earthquakes in Turkey and then the devastating earthquakes in Greece showed that the two nations, the two neighbors, have feelings for each other. Thousands of Turks were buried alive under the ruins of the earthquake. Greek teams went over to help, to save Turkish lives, and later, when the Greek earthquakes occurred, we saw the same phenomenon—Turkish teams coming over despite the differences they have politically to help save Greek lives. We salute that human element and we praise both the people of Greece and the people of Turkey for showing these humanitarian feelings and for helping each other. We hope that this new climate will prevail toward finding a solution to the Cyprus problem.

*Washington's Identity Crisis*

# Uncertain America

## by Maureen S. Steinbruner and Michael Spirtas

The United States enters the new millennium as an incredibly strong, prosperous country, with enormous military, economic, and technological advantages over most other countries in the world, and with a popular culture that has penetrated the global consciousness. In any country finding itself in such a situation, it is predictable that such perceived dominance would generate an interest on the part of political leaders, and probably the citizenry as well, in extending national influence and exercising national leadership abroad. But America at present is ambivalent, conflicted, and highly uncertain about its international role. In particular, there is no effective political consensus in the United States today about emerging issues of international governance.

Many references to the American polity's current stance toward international cooperation emphasize what is seen as an increasing attitude of neoisolationism. While we do not deny that there is an isolationist element within the public, we will argue that upon closer examination, a more complex picture emerges. We believe that Americans are experiencing something of a national identity crisis at present, that national identity and the politics of international cooperation are intrinsically related issues, and that U.S. leaders thus face a significant challenge in framing this country's view of itself and its international agenda.

### AMBIVALENT HEGEMON

Reflecting its unassailable status as the one "superpower" left standing after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the unusually impressive performance of the U.S. economy throughout the 1990s, America appropriately ended the "American century" in a position of unquestioned dominance in policy-setting within international organizations. Its position of leadership among the Permanent Five at the United Nations is not unique. The United States tends to cast an overwhelmingly large vote in Brussels, in Geneva, and in Washington, as well as in New York. And, where it counts, the United States generally has a veto as well.

In spite of its undeniable stature, however, in the aftermath of the cold war, America's leaders have seemed to find it increasingly difficult to settle on a consistent, bipartisan line of policy with respect to U.S. participation in international institutions. While there were sharp arguments over the details of policy and the choice of

**Maureen S. Steinbruner** is President of the Center for National Policy (CNP), Washington, DC, where she directs work on a range of economic, domestic, and foreign policy issues. **Michael Spirtas** is a Fellow at CNP, where he directs the center's foreign policy programs.

strategies, the cold war consensus largely assumed agreement about the overall goals. Now, arguments about UN contributions, controversy over World Bank and International Monetary Fund lending policies, stalemate over future World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, disputes about the role of human rights in U.S. policy, and congressional defiance of the Kyoto Protocol, along with the Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),[1] reflect a significant amount of domestic political conflict over the ends, as well as the means, of U.S. participation in international agreements and organizations.

Partisans on both sides of these disputes blame their opponents for failing to respond appropriately to international imperatives. In reacting to the defeat of some of its central international initiatives, the Clinton administration has characterized the Republican majority in Congress as isolationist. Republican opponents of the administration, in turn, have accused the Clinton foreign policy team of too tepid a defense of engagement policies, inattention to problems prior to the WTO talks in Seattle, and bad timing in bringing ratification of the CTBT before Congress. Observers in the foreign policy community tend to fault policymakers in both parties for inadequate leadership on these issues. Leaders respond with reference to public opinion, citing what they see as a growing indifference on the part of the public, if not outright hostility, to foreign involvements.[2] Critics, however, point to countervailing evidence of strong and continuing public support for international engagement and for American participation in international institutions. They contend that policymakers who cite negative public views as determinative are out of touch, misreading public intentions, or selectively using poll results to suit their own agendas.[3] While Americans may not place foreign policy priorities very high on their lists of concerns, it is argued, they nonetheless remain fundamentally internationalist and committed to sharing global burdens fairly.

Can these perspectives be reconciled? Are American leaders today simply out of touch with public feelings about the issue of U.S. international participation, as charged? Or is there some other explanation for the widely held perception that Americans are more seriously conflicted about global engagement than they used to be? One interpretation that needs to be considered is that the American body politic—including both policymakers and the public—is wrestling to reestablish a clear sense of national identity now that exercising leadership in the cold war is no longer relevant to their sense of who they are.

Frequently overlooked in assessing the meaning of specific disputes about international participation, perhaps because it is assumed to be self-evident, is the relationship of any given policy decision to the prevailing sense of "nation" that it is intended to express.[4] As political scientist Kenneth Hoover put it, "What formal political systems do is institutionalize procedures and policies that shape and manage identities so as to serve some concept of the common good. . . . The policies that get made apply to groups of people: welfare recipients, business people, polluters, or maybe everybody."[5] Everybody, indeed. Foreign policy decisions, and especially decisions about participation in international institutions, require reflection on the nation as a whole, what the

United States is about, and most important, whether particular international relationships are or are not consistent with national self-definition.

Thus, it is possible to see arguments over issues like UN dues, or the propriety of placing U.S. troops under international command, as part of a necessary and possibly inevitable struggle to resolve who Americans now are as a nation, and where and how they fit into some larger and still emergent post–cold war international system.

## CURRENT PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES

For several years, with increasing insistence, general opinion surveys have reported that the U.S. public is turning inward and away from international engagement.[6] This is typically expressed as low priority given to foreign policy concerns, indifference to news coverage of foreign affairs, or negative responses to the idea of troop commitments overseas or funding for international initiatives. Such survey findings reinforce the view among political analysts that there is a growing mood of isolationism among the American public.

On the other hand, opinion specialists who follow international affairs in particular have for some time argued that such findings are subject to misinterpretation. They believe, and have evidence to indicate, that more extensive, more probing analyses show a more favorable public view of U.S. foreign involvement, and thus provide a truer picture of the public's actual perceptions and policy assessments.

When you sit them down and really talk, this line of inquiry indicates, Americans care about international stability, are willing to spend much larger amounts than the United States actually does on foreign aid, are not as casualty-averse as political leaders assume, and so forth. A recent example of this analysis that was especially thorough in its methodology is *Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism* by Kull and Destler.[7] The authors describe a multistage process that involved an initial round of interviews with policymakers, a comprehensive analysis of existing poll data, focus groups, a further set of workshops with policymakers, and lastly a nationwide poll and a set of congressional district polls. The results document a wide variance between what policymakers believe as to negative public attitudes and what the study actually shows. In particular, broad public support for U.S. participation in the United Nations, specifically favoring UN peacekeeping operations and paying UN dues, is documented, along with a willingness to provide foreign aid. For example, a 1995 poll found the public favoring UN action over U.S. unilateral moves in trouble spots by a margin of 66% to 29%.[8] Similarly, when shown information on actual foreign aid spending, the public supports current levels, and giving in general, although as a low priority.[9]

These findings are contrasted with the strong belief expressed by policymakers that the public is hostile or indifferent in these areas. Authors Kull and Destler offer a useful analysis of the reasons for this gap. They cite a generally low salience of foreign policy issues in congressional elections, candidates' disinclination to poll on these issues, and executive-branch officials' view that less public attention to foreign policy is preferable, to provide room for difficult decisions to be made without provoking large

public controversies. Another important reason given for the gap between policy-makers' views of public attitudes and the reality as expressed by Americans is the inaccurate information most members of the public have about details, such as the fact that U.S. spending on foreign aid actually is a much smaller portion of the budget than what they say they expect and want it to be. Typical perceptions are around 15%, whereas the real number is closer to 1.5%.[10]

The basic conclusion drawn from the analysis is that policymakers do not understand public views and values and are wrong in their interpretations of the public mood on these issues. Yet policymakers might not be so far out of touch as it would seem if the larger question of U.S. national identity is brought into the picture.

## THE AMERICAN VOTER

Current opinion, primarily what general opinion surveys of issues in the news tend to measure, is important as a reflection of what the public is thinking at a given moment in time. Such surveys reveal how much attention is being paid to a subject, what information is being communicated about it, and so on. As a practical matter, any current policy decision being made by the government must, out of necessity, take some account of such views. But these opinions are generally quite volatile and do not necessarily reflect the considered thoughts that deeper and more systematic survey methods can reach.

As a practical matter, the primary way that decision makers assess these more fundamental leanings on the part of the public is in their effect on voting behavior. The salience of issues in a given election campaign, and the intensity of voters' views on issues even of high salience, are aspects of opinion that are particularly important to evaluating the relevance of those opinions to political leaders. Moreover, it is the conjoint expression of attitude over a wide range of issues, in relation to a particular candidate and party, in relation to the options being offered, that matters. When faced with constrained choices and specific tradeoffs, and confronted with sharp disputes about the desirability of specific policy courses, what issue tends to override what? And why?

The act of voting is an extremely complex one, very different from expressing a current view—even a well-formed and well-informed view—on a particular subject. It reflects the reduction of a broad set of concerns into a single, usually binary, choice. An individual's personal attitudes, values, and sense of self-interest must be melded in this choice with the individual's feelings about the needs of self, family, and community, as well as a judgment about the party or candidate most likely to satisfy these needs effectively.

At the broadest level, the act of voting for national officials adds to other factors a distant but often critical set of concerns having to do with the larger collective interest, both in the nation as a nation and, in the end, in its role in the world. If we assume that, for example, for the purpose of voting for president, it is primarily with regard to the sense of oneself as "American" that one holds the most meaningful view of what the "United States" as a whole should do, then in some sense the voter must

carry into the polls a feeling or idea about what America is and should be doing as a nation.

---

## When they vote, citizens are acting not only as individuals but also as part of a shared American identity.

---

Separate and distinct from one's personal attitudes about, say, compassion for the poor overseas or how much funding, ideally, the U.S. government might contribute to alleviating world hunger is a more basic issue that each citizen must confront, or feel, as he or she considers whether to vote in a national election, and for whom. That is the question of how the country, as a country, is doing, and where it should be going. In this, citizens are acting not as individuals alone in the world but rather as part of a shared identity as Americans. As pollster Frederick T. Steeper put it, "We have found that respondents' voting behavior—whether they reward or punish the incumbent—correlates with their answers about how the country is doing far more than do their responses about how they themselves are getting along."[11]

Some evidence from recent focus groups shows a public concerned and distressed about how the country as a country is doing.[12] Beyond this, participants in focus groups for some time have found it difficult to say what it means today to be "American," while expressing the view that it was easier to do so in the past.[13] They also have trouble articulating what they have in common with other Americans.

Before addressing some possible implications of Americans' current feelings of national identity for U.S. international decision-making, it is useful to look at a couple of recent non-U.S. examples in which issues of national identity seemed significant in framing policies of international cooperation.

### NATIONAL IDENTITY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Most scholars of international relations argue that states cooperate internationally when they perceive it to be in their national interest to do so, but this statement invites the question: how are national interests formed? Even studies that uphold the importance of national interest show the difficulty in defining such an interest a priori.[14] It is often difficult to determine what is in the national interest, but more centrally, at issue in any such determination is the very sense of nation and purpose that frames the calculus.

The relationship between the central question of national identity and decisions relating to international cooperation is a complex one, and there is no consensus among scholars about a single way to approach the topic.[15] Social psychologists have established through experimentation that individuals who believe themselves to belong to a common group are more likely to engage in cooperative behavior with other members of that group.[16] If we apply this principle to international politics, one measure of a state's tendency to cooperate (or not) with other states could be to examine its relationship to the states that would be involved in the cooperative agreement. Presumably, if a leader considers his state to be part of a group of states, he is more

likely to favor cooperation within this group. For leaders in open, democratic societies with frequent elections, what they believe in this respect ought to bear some kind of relationship to what, in turn, the public believes.

A few examples of international cooperation involving Britain and France help to illustrate this argument.[17] Both countries are industrialized democracies of about 60 million citizens. Both are former great powers that had to learn to adapt to their changed status in international politics following World War II. Despite these similarities, however, the two states have followed quite different policies toward economic and military cooperation with other states in the postwar period.

The French joined the European Monetary System (EMS) upon its formation in 1978–79, while the British requested only observer status. The British did eventually enroll the pound in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the EMS in 1990, but withdrew during the "Black Wednesday" currency crisis of September 1992. The French championed the formation of a single European currency in 1999, while the British have refrained from actively participating in European monetary cooperation to this day.

The French and British economies are different, but not in any way that explains their different stances toward European monetary cooperation. Instead of looking solely to economic causes to explain the differences in British and French policy, our approach suggests that we examine the differences in French and British popular conceptions of their own identity.

The French have shown a high level of identification with Western Europe from the late 1970s to today. In 1982, 61% of French respondents to a Eurobarometer poll answered that they either "often" or "sometimes" felt themselves to be Europeans in addition to being French, indicating a high level of French affinity with Western Europe.[18] French public opinion on this question fluctuated throughout the 1980s, reaching a high in 1986, when 69% of French respondents noted that they "often" or "sometimes" felt themselves to be Europeans, and a low in 1987, when 53% responded similarly. Even the low of 53% for 1987 was higher than the European Community average of 48% for that year. On the whole, public-opinion data show relatively high French identification with Europe.

Despite the switch in prime minister from moderate conservative Giscard d'Estaing to socialist François Mitterrand, through change from socialist experimentation to rigueur, during periods of one-party rule and cohabitation, the French government repeatedly expressed its willingness to coordinate its currency's exchange rate with those of fellow European states. During the pressure of the Black Wednesday crisis, the French refused to withdraw the franc from the ERM, even though international currency traders threatened to bid the franc lower in world markets. Such policy continuity would have been unlikely without strong French identification with Europe.

Comparatively, British identification with Europe has been lower. As was the case with French public-opinion data, British respondents' attitudes toward Europe varied from year to year. Although there is support for the supposition that British affinity

toward Europe rose over time, it still remained low when compared to that of France. Of the nine times that Eurobarometer polled the British public between 1978 and 1992, the lowest combination of respondents who answered that they "often" or "sometimes" thought of themselves as European in addition to being British was 24% in March/April 1983. Subsequent polls show that the percentage of respondents answering similarly rose over the next few years, reaching a high of 36% in autumn 1988. Two subsequent polls show that this feeling of European citizenship dropped to 28% in both 1989 and 1990, then rose to 31% in 1991. While the difference between the poll responses between the early 1980s and the late 1980s/early 1990s is not overwhelming, it does indicate that British identification with Europe grew over time.

Growth in group identity allowed the British to bring the pound into the ERM in 1990 and to sign the Maastricht Treaty, the document outlining the concrete steps that would eventually lead to creation of the euro, in 1991. Still, the ambivalent nature of British identification with Western Europe influenced London's insistence on an "opt out" clause in the Maastricht Treaty and their decision to pull the pound out of the ERM during the Black Wednesday crisis. Today, it is clear that the Blair government would like Britain to join the euro, but lack of national identification with Western Europe has helped prevent this momentous step.

One might be tempted to argue that the British are more concerned with their independence than the French, and that this explains the difference in their policies toward European monetary cooperation. However, an examination of their policies toward security cooperation shows that this is not the case. If we look at the two states' policies toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), we see that here the French seem to be more concerned with their independence than the British.

Both Britain and France were founding members of NATO in 1949. Since standing side by side at the alliance's formation, however, the two countries' experiences with NATO have been profoundly different. The British overall have worked within alliance channels, while the French have expressed disapproval of American leadership of the alliance. Eventually, the French withdrew from the alliance's integrated military command and asked that NATO's headquarters and equipment be moved out of France in 1966.

French policy toward NATO was affected by the fact that in this case, alliance cooperation involved working not just within Europe but with a North Atlantic group of states, including the United States. Polling data indicate that the French identified quite a bit with the North Atlantic group of states in 1949 but that this identification dropped over time. When French poll respondents were asked to rank other states by French feelings for each of their peoples, more than 25% ranked Americans first and more than 30% ranked the British second.[19] Between 1946 and 1948, more than 70% of French respondents consistently supported the presence of American troops in France. The high level of affinity that the French exhibited with respect to the North Atlantic in 1949 showed some signs of erosion by 1954. For example, when asked to name a country that sought to dominate the world in 1953, 25% of French

citizens surveyed named the United States, quite close to the 26% who named the USSR. In a series of polls between November 1954 and December 1957, more than 50% of French respondents regularly answered that they had a "very good," "good," or "average" opinion of the United States and United Kingdom, while 30% to 40% answered similarly for the USSR. In December 1957, 62% answered this way for the United Kingdom, 59% for the United States, and 37% for the USSR. In 1963, 59% of French respondents supported the idea that a unified Western Europe could promote its own policies independently of the United States. In the same year, 45% answered that France should act independently of U.S. policies, in contrast to 31% who agreed that France would be better off if it were narrowly associated with the United States. By the mid-1960s, the French tended to identify their interests independently of fellow North Atlantic countries, particularly the United States.

## A country's perception of its national identity affects its attitudes toward engagement with the rest of the world.

In contrast to the French, British identification with the North Atlantic group has been strong throughout NATO's history. In October 1954, 49% of British respondents reported either a "very good" or "good" opinion of the United States, while 6% reported similar opinions of the USSR, and 4% for China.[20] The gap between British opinions of the United States, on the one hand, and of China and the USSR, on the other, supports the proposition that the British perceived themselves as sharing an affinity with a group of states associated with the United States. In November 1956, the month of the ill-fated Suez intervention, 77% of British respondents argued that the basic interests of the United Kingdom were either very much (20%) or fairly well (57%) in agreement with those of the United States. In comparison, only 29% of French respondents answered similarly. A slight 13% of British respondents noted that their interests were very different or rather different from U.S. interests, compared to 36% of French responses for these options.

These trends continued into the 1960s. In 1962, 74% of respondents answered that British interests were either "very much in agreement" or "fairly well in agreement" with those of the United States. When compared to the 47% of French citizens who responded similarly, the high level of affinity becomes apparent. A February 1963 poll showed that 70% of British citizens felt that British interests were either "very much" or "fairly well" in agreement with those of the United States. In February 1965, 56% of British respondents noted that they regarded America as Britain's best friend. At the same time, it is important to note that 47% answered in a March 1965 poll that British foreign policy depended too much on the United States, so the perception of identification was tempered with some yearning for independence.[21]

The British and French examples are relevant for understanding the U.S. approach toward international cooperation, in the sense that a country's perception of its national identity affects its attitudes toward engagement with the rest of the world. Presently, it is unclear, in the aftermath of the cold war, to what extent Americans identify with groups of states, and for what purposes.

## AMERICAN IDENTITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

From the time of its founding, a sense of America as above the fray has characterized U.S. attitudes toward events abroad, from Washington's warning of "foreign entanglements" up through arguments over U.S. participation in World War II prior to Pearl Harbor and on to the present day. A sense of America as unique has also been important, reflected in concepts like Henry Luce's "American Century."[22] In the United States, events of the past several decades generated a positive idea internally of America as an international participant—as "leader of the free world"—for the first time. The level of U.S. international cooperation after World War II was grounded in this identity. It gave Washington a clearly defined role from which it exercised leadership in establishing a new set of international organizations intended to promote global economic stability and maintain "Western" security.

This is not to say that the postwar perception of the U.S. role in international cooperative ventures went unchallenged, either at home or abroad. The British and French attempted, unsuccessfully, to present the United States with a fait accompli by intervening militarily against Egypt over Suez in 1956; the French chafed at what they saw as excessive U.S. influence in the world, eventually withdrawing from NATO's integrated military command in 1966; and Americans vigorously debated the desirability of stationing U.S. troops in Europe throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, Washington's almost solitary involvement in Vietnam showed most clearly the limits of U.S. ability to achieve international security cooperation, as only a few other countries could be brought to support U.S. intervention there. But for the most part, America's identity as "leader of the free world" proved robust and functional over time, providing a solid base of public opinion tolerant of specific foreign policy initiatives, from the Truman Doctrine to Reagan's initial intervention in Central America.

Since the end of the cold war, however, U.S. political leaders have been working to articulate an effective new vision of American national identity in an international context. President George Bush posited a "New World Order" in which America would exercise strong international leadership to maintain a system of sovereign states and stable international relationships. The Clinton administration attempted "assertive multilateralism,"[23] later rejecting this phrase in favor of viewing the United States as the "indispensable nation."[24] Prior to becoming secretary of state, then U.S. ambassador to the UN Madeleine K. Albright elaborated on the latter phrase by outlining what it would mean in terms of specific tasks, such as promoting peace and democracy and preventing nuclear proliferation.[25]

## What America means to the rest of the world is at present very open to interpretation.

This ongoing effort to define America's place in the world reflects a real need to address underlying public uncertainty: an uncertainty about issues much more fundamentally deep-seated than the specifics of individual policy decisions about international cooperation and involvement.

Despite a pervasive optimism about the future in general, Americans are concerned and anxious about global developments. For example, looking at what the public thinks about "America's Place in the World," the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press on two occasions in the 1990s found Americans expressing strong dissatisfaction "with the way things are going in the world."[26] In more recent surveys, asking somewhat different but related questions, Pew researchers found a predominating optimism about self, family, and the country overall but also some dire predictions about the likelihood of calamities to come, with emphasis given to problems associated with globalism. The pattern of global fears "extends to the American view of the U.S. economy and the country's role in the world. Although two thirds of the public believes the U.S. economy will grow stronger in the next 50 years, half expect that the average American will be hurt by the global economy."[27]

It seems that, ironically, events of the later years of the "American Century" left Americans with a weakened, or at least a murkier, sense of their identity with respect to the rest of the world. The public appear to be reacting to this national identity dilemma, at least in part, by turning its attention whenever it can away from problematic, anxiety-provoking news stories about international affairs. While members of the public do seem to accept the idea of global participation in principle, they have no clear idea of America's role in the world today around which to organize a comfortable sense of national identity.

## CONCLUSION

Psychologists suggest that individual identity is at once both a personal and a social construct. Who we think we are is based on a sense of our uniqueness as a person but also is grounded in a view of the groups of which we do and do not feel a part. We believe that national identity too is framed in these two important and related ways, and that like some other countries in the post–cold war era, Americans are having problems establishing a clear sense of who they are as a nation. The ongoing process is taking them through a reexamination of values, a rediscovery of what Americans have in common with each other as a people, and—not insignificantly— a reconsideration of what they have in common with various groupings of nations around the world.

If this assessment is correct, it poses both an opportunity and a challenge for U.S. political leaders over the coming years. The opportunity arises because of the very vagueness with which Americans today appear to be defining their sense of nation. What America is about, what it means in the world and to the rest of the world, is at present very open to interpretation, and a reasonable but compelling interpretation should, presumably, have great effect. The challenge, though, will be to find a positive definition of American identity that is consistent with the restrictions on sovereignty necessarily imposed by the framework of international cooperation and engagement. The public wants to see the United States lessen the country's direct share of world responsibility, at a time when an increase might be reasonably called for. The public wants the United States to remain engaged, but prefers acting in concert with other

states or through international organizations so as to bear fewer burdens of leadership. Yet, Americans' willingness to accept others' agendas and objectives is quite limited. Thus political arguments currently under way in the United States about the future direction of its participation in the international arena, addressing issues of both substance and procedure, come at a time of critical uncertainty among the public with respect to the appropriate U.S. international role. These arguments and the policy outcomes that will result as they are resolved are likely to have a profound and formative effect on public support for a U.S. global role during the next several decades. This is one of the most important issues at stake as voters choose between two different kinds of internationalist leaders in the presidential election, and as they form a Congress and Senate to work with a new president in the years ahead.

## Notes

[1] On which see Robert G. Torricelli, this issue, pp. 33–37.

[2] Many political analysts, including members of the U.S. Congress, viewed the 1994 congressional election as a blow against the UN. See Steven Kull and I.M. Destler, *Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1999) p. 13.

[3] Ibid., p. 230.

[4] We often refer to the "nation" instead of the "state." The former refers more to the community of people residing in a given territory, while the latter refers to the legitimate legal authority with jurisdiction over this community of people.

[5] Kenneth Hoover (with J. Marcia and K. Parris), *The Power of Identity: Politics in a New Key* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1997), p. 6.

[6] For example, *U.S. News and World Report* reported a Roper poll finding that only about 2% of persons surveyed put "protecting the country" at the top of their list of priorities. See Richard J. Newman, "Why Missile Politics Is Taking a Right Turn: Washington's Roiled, But Nobody's Listening," *U.S. News and World Report,* Oct. 18, 1999.

[7] See note 2.

[8] Kull and Destler, *Misreading the Public,* p. 79.

[9] Ibid., p. 117.

[10] Ibid., p. 123.

[11] Ibid., p. 3.

[12] From focus groups conducted for the Center for National Policy in Aug. 1999 by Lake Snell Perry & Associates with John Deardourff. These groups also happened to produce a number of volunteered anti–foreign aid comments, and even the suggestion that there should be less emphasis placed on foreign language instruction in high schools.

[13] See, for example, "Diagnosing Voter Discontent," report on a series of focus groups and personal interviews prepared by Strategic Frameworking, Inc., for the Center for National Policy, Washington, D.C., Apr. 1996.

[14] Stephen Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1978).

[15] For a sample of approaches, see Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel, eds., *The Origins of National Interests* (London: Frank Cass, 1999).

[16] See Harvey A. Hornstein, "Promotive Tension: The Basis of Prosocial Behavior from a Lewinian Perspective," *Journal of Social Issues,* vol. 28, no. 3, 1972, pp. 191–218; idem, *Cruelty and Kindness: A New Look at Aggression and Altruism* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976) esp. ch. 7; John C. Turner, "Towards a Cognitive Redefinition of the Social Group," in Henri Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982); and idem, "Social Categorization and Social Discrimination in the Minimal Group Paradigm," in Henri Tajfel, ed., *Differentiation between Social Groups* (London: Academic Press, 1978).

[17] This section draws from Michael Spirtas, "With and Without: British and French Policies Toward Economic and Military Cooperation" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia Univ., 1998).

[18] Unless noted otherwise, all public-opinion data are from various editions of Eurobarometer surveys (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities).

[19] *Sondages*: *Revue Frantaise de l'Opinion Publique,* vol. 15, no. 2, 1953, p. 7. These results and those noted subsequently in this section are taken from a poll administered in 1950, which was after the French signed the North Atlantic Pact, so French entrance into the pact could have inflated these figures. If other French opinion data at this time are indicative of French opinion before 1949, however, this poll gives a fairly accurate indication of French regard for the Americans and British prior to the establishment of the North Atlantic Pact.

[20] Richard L. Merritt and Donald J. Puchala, *Western European Perspectives on International Affairs: Public Opinion Studies and Evaluations* (New York: Praeger, 1968). For the discussion that follows, see pp. 244–255.

[21] George H. Gallup, ed., *The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls: Great Britain, vol. II, 1965–1975* (New York: Random House, 1976) pp. 789, 794.

[22] For a general discussion of the roots and character of early isolationist elements in American foreign policy, see Felix Gilbert, *To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1961). The Luce essay can be found in William Appleman Williams et al., eds., *America in Vietnam: A Documentary History* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 1975).

[23] For analysis of assertive multilateralism, see Michael N. Barnett, "The United Nations and Global Security: The Norm Is Mightier than the Sword*," Ethics & International Affairs*, vol. 9, 1995, pp. 37–54.

[24] For example, see President Bill Clinton's second inaugural address, Jan. 20, 1997 (available online: http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/html/1997-01-20.html).

[25] Madeleine K. Albright, "America the Indispensable" (remarks at the Edmund S. Muskie Distinguished Public Service Award Dinner, Center for National Policy, Washington, D.C., Sept. 19, 1996).

[26] The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, "Candidate Qualities May Trump Issues in 2000," Oct. 18, 1999; and idem, "America Looks to the 21st Century," Oct. 24, 1999 (available online: http://www.people-press.org).

[27] Pew Research Center, "America Looks to the 21st Century."

*Washington's Identity Crisis*

# Contemplating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

by Robert G. Torricelli

There are always moments in our lives we suspect we will always remember, those times that punctuate our activities and our experiences. Several nights ago, on the eve of the Senate's consideration of this treaty, President Clinton, sitting in the residence, reminded some of us that the last time the Senate rejected a treaty was in 1920, the Treaty of Versailles. The Treaty called for the establishment of a League of Nations. The United States, as reflected by the Senate, was so traumatized by the First World War, so anxious for the creation of a time that it would never visit again, that it drew all the wrong lessons from the First World War. As a consequence, it defeated the Treaty. A Treaty that was, in Woodrow Wilson's words, "the last hope of mankind."

We now find ourselves in this debate 80 years later. Yet having emerged from the cold war, the trauma and sacrifices of generations in dealing with that enormous national struggle, I fear that, once again, we are drawing all the wrong lessons. Essentially, it is the belief of many of my colleagues that the arms control regimes of the last forty years were successful; that the bipartisan foreign policy from Eisenhower to Clinton, based on a concept of nonproliferation and arms control regimes, could provide real security for the United States; and that seeking security in arms races and technological military dominance was illusory.

It is extraordinary that, during this debate, we demonstrate a lack of confidence in arms control regimes or believe the United States is better defended outside of these treaties because that is such a contradiction with national experience.

## Having emerged from the cold war, I fear that we are drawing all the wrong lessons.

In the last forty years, the United States, from Eisenhower to Nixon, Kennedy, Johnson, Carter, Bush, and Reagan, has ratified START I and II, SALT I and II, the ABM Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Nonproliferation Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Open Skies Agreement, and the Outer Space Agreement, and signed the Missile Technology Control Regime. The nation is profoundly more secure because of each and every one of those treaties and regimes.

**Robert G. Torricelli,** Democrat of New Jersey, has been a member of the U.S. Senate since 1996. He delivered this speech to the Senate on October 8, 1999.

33

Every Senate and each president at a moment in history faced the same judgment we face today. Are we better off by allowing other nations and ourselves to develop weapons outside of these regimes or should we have confidence in our ability to verify and be more secure within their limits?

It appears the Senate may, for the first time in a generation and for the second time in this century, believe that it is better to reject a treaty negotiated by an American president and operate outside of its regime. It is a profound decision with enormous consequences. The simple truth is, arms control regimes have enhanced the security of the United States; indeed, they have enhanced the security of all nations.

Since 1945, despite their development, possession, and deployment by a variety of nations, nuclear weapons have never been used in a hostile environment. It may be the first or certainly the longest period in human history that weapons were developed and not used. Indeed, nations have even gone to war with each other or been in severe conflict and not used these weapons. It is the ultimate testament that arms control works to protect national security.

I would understand if the leader of the Iranian parliament or the North Korean Supreme People's Assembly were to rise in their respective chambers and argue passionately against this treaty. They would have their reasons. The treaty will allow the United States to maintain the preeminent nuclear stockpile in the world, having the only effective means of continuing to test its weapons by simulation, while the treaty would make it difficult for those nations to continue to develop and modernize their nuclear arsenal. Their opposition would be rational. Our opposition is irrational.

It would be understandable if members of the National People's Congress in Beijing would rise in indignation against China becoming a signatory to the treaty. The thought that China, a great power, possessing eighteen missiles capable of delivering a weapon, now on the verge of developing important new and dangerous technology both to deliver these weapons and to miniaturize them to threaten a potential adversary in the United States or Russia or Europe, would join this treaty would be troubling to them.

The Chinese, by entering into this treaty, would be unable to test those weapons, making it difficult to know their effectiveness or their reliability. Their opposition would be understandable; it would be rational. Ours is not.

This treaty is an endorsement of the international military status quo, and at this snapshot in time in the life of this planet, the military status quo is that the United States is the preeminent military power with an abundance of weapons, sophistication of weapons, delivery of weapons. If this current arrangement and distribution of power is to be preserved for a generation, it means that every nation is accepting American preeminence. By their endorsement of this treaty and their signature of this treaty, extraordinarily, every other nation seems to be willing to accept that preeminence, ironically, except us. We would reject the treaty and allow other nations at a relative disadvantage to test, develop, or deploy effective weapons.

There are several important consequences in the defeat of this treaty the Senate needs to consider: first, the damage, not necessarily militarily, but diplomatically to

the leadership of the United States. This country has recognized for more than fifty years that the only real security of this country is an alliance based principally on the foundation of NATO rested on the credibility of American political leadership.

## Every other nation seems willing to accept U.S. military preeminence, ironically, except us.

The defeat of this treaty will put us at variance with the leaders of Germany, France, and Britain, who even on this day have appealed to the Senate to endorse this treaty. France and Britain have communicated their strong desire. They have reminded us that they have made changes in their own doctrine, and their own weapons choices, based on this treaty. They have also reminded us that if we defeat this treaty, we are in some measure separating not simply our judgments but our future planning and security from our traditional allies—the foundation of our international alliance system of our security. It will cause damage to our credibility and our leadership that will not be easily repaired.

Second, defeat of this treaty, for all practical purposes, is an end to our efforts, undertaken on a bipartisan basis for a generation, on nonproliferation. It is a practical end to our nonproliferation efforts because it sends a message to each rogue regime, every nation that possesses the capability to develop nuclear weapons, that there is this new sense of legitimacy in them doing so, because the United States has rejected a treaty that would have contained this threat. The United States will lose credibility with nations, like India and Pakistan, when we argue that they should not test again or deploy weapons.

Third—perhaps most profoundly and immediately—it will lead to the possibility of the testing and the development of the technologies that China has obtained from the United States, through espionage or other means, and allow them to develop a full capability.

There is a final factor. The Senate has convened to debate the question of a treaty on a comprehensive test ban. But it is not the only treaty that is at issue. The defeat of this Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will certainly mean that the START agreement pending before the Russian Duma will never be adopted.

Our chance, with a stroke of a pen, to destroy thousands of Russian nuclear warheads, potentially aimed at the United States—-the greatest single threat to the security of this nation under changed political circumstances—will never be destroyed. We debate one treaty, but we are deciding the future of two.

Earlier in this day debates centered on procedures and hearings, whether or not the treaty was fully considered. I serve as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. I, too, must express my profound disappointment, as a representative of the State of New Jersey, and as a member of that committee, of not being given the opportunity to fully debate, to consider, to hear witnesses on what potentially could be the most important vote I will ever cast as a senator.

People of good judgment might be able to differ on the merits of this treaty, but no one can defend that an issue of this profound importance to the life of this country

did not receive the consideration it deserved or senators within the comity of this institution were not given the due consideration to learn, debate, and be heard.

Because I believe, however, this issue is so important—while I am convinced of its merits and the need for immediate ratification—I end much as I began with that memory of 1920.

Most of us are probably convinced the Senate made the wrong judgment on the League of Nations, setting the world on a dangerous downward spiral of confrontation, having come to the false conclusion that America would be secure alone behind her oceans, that in isolation somehow we would find peace. It was wrong.

But in truth, if the moment could be revisited, President Wilson, while right on the issue, should have been less proud, more willing to meet his adversaries, and given them extra consideration on the treaty. While I profoundly believe President Clinton was right to endorse this treaty and to urge its adoption, I urge him to do the same today.

Let us make it unequivocally clear that the president of the United States, upon being told by the director of the CIA that he cannot provide complete assurances that any unexplainable explosions of any source within Russia or China—by our national technical means—will cause the United States, unless explanations and inspections are made immediately available, to abrogate the treaty.

Second, the president make abundantly clear that any refusal to allow inspections, even if not absolutely required by the treaty, because it is in the national interest, would cause us to abrogate the treaty.

Third, the president commit the United States immediately to develop a national technical means to distinguish between different forms of explosions and small-level nuclear testing, and a program begin immediately.

And fourth, that if, indeed, as I believe is provided in the treaty, this president is informed by lab directors that they can no longer assure the safety or the operational capability of our weapons, we will abrogate the treaty.

Let that be clear to the Senate and to the American people, let there be no question. And if there is no question on those issues, then there is no argument against this treaty.

I can remember as a boy asking a history teacher why it was, if history occurred as a continuum, from generation to generation through the centuries, history was written in chapters and in volumes, which both began and ended? And I remember she told me: Because that is how it occurs.

We are between the volumes of history. If this Senate is to decide that the bipartisan commitment to arms control as an element of national security for the last forty years has been an error, we are ending not only a chapter but a volume of the military and diplomatic history of this country, we are entering into a very uncertain future, for our security is dictated only by what weapons are designed, deployed, and used—a lawless time that is not safer than the twentieth century, but where the twenty-first century will be profoundly less safe.

It will be a time in which, I believe, members of this Senate will have difficulty looking in the eyes of their children and their children's children explaining how there

was a brief moment when we could commit all the nations of the world not to test these nuclear weapons and therefore as a practical matter to be unable, by many nations, to deploy them or ever to use them—and we lost the moment.

## There was a brief moment when we could commit all the nations of the world not to test nuclear weapons and never to use them—and we lost the moment.

You may feel confident in your vote today; it may make political sense. You may be convinced of your own rhetoric, but you will never ever—if one of these weapons is ever used in a hostile environment; if one of these rogue regimes, from North Korea to Iran, ever tests one of these weapons—you will never look your own children in the eye with confidence in your judgment or feeling that you served them or your country.

I have not been in this institution long, but long enough to know this treaty does not have enough votes to be ratified.

The president of the United States, recognizing the enormous potential diplomatic damage of its defeat and the consequences militarily of sending a message to other nations that there will be no further proliferation efforts or control on testing, has asked, as the commander in chief, the elected representative of the American people, that this vote not occur. What have we come to as a Senate, if the president of the United States makes such a request in the interest of our national security and our diplomatic position in the world and we turn a deaf ear? If you cannot do good by voting for this treaty, do not do harm by defeating it. Allow the moment to pass. At least allow the world to live with an ambiguous result rather than a definitive conclusion to our national commitment to arms control.

We vote on this treaty, but, indeed, we vote on whether to ratify or reject a national strategy of a generation and whether arms control will continue to be part of the security of the United States and our strategy of dealing with potentially hostile nations. It is not a judgment I would have had to mark the beginning of the twenty-first century. It shows a profound failure to learn the lessons of the twentieth century, but it is what it is. At least we should be able to lose this moment and go on to debate and make judgments another day.

*Washington's Identity Crisis*
# The Art and Craft of Strategy

by Robert E. Hunter

A new journal of international affairs for a new century—this is timely, useful, and appropriate. It comes a decade after the end of the cold war, which for its part replaced a global system that for two generations had governed a large part of relations among the world's major countries. To be sure, the cold war was an aberration—nothing like it was seen before—but by its end it had sunk deeply into the consciousness of political leaders, analysts, and other commentators, so much so that few if any of these figures predicted its end, even though, in retrospect, that end has taken on the color of inevitability.

The years between the late 1940s and late 1980s provided a degree of certainty in international politics. The classic fluidity of relations among states gave way to a rigidity, at least in the basic outlines of the international political and economic system. The cold war was not without open conflict. Not everything that happened in international politics was subsumed within the overall framework, nor did the central competition between East and West extend to every corner of the world. But the cold war framework did take precedence as *the* organizing principle for international relations.

With those predictable guideposts and confines now gone, the success of U.S. foreign policy will depend in large part on a renaissance in strategic thinking. The nature of cold war conflict led to a narrowing of strategic focus that now must be reexpanded for the United States to have a clear and inclusive picture of the challenges and opportunities presented by today's world.

## THE COLD WAR FRAMEWORK

Though it may not have seemed so to Americans at the time, in retrospect the cold war was relatively simple. With all necessary qualifications about those parts that did not fit the whole, in fact U.S. foreign policy was essentially governed by three basic goals: 1) to contain the power of the Soviet Union and that of its allies, associates, and acolytes; 2) to counter the scope and appeal of communism; and 3) to lead a growing global economy. All else was to be measured against the requirements imposed by these three goals. If they were found to apply—though in many places and cases they did not—then alternative principles, policies, and values had to be shunted aside or at least relegated to an inferior place.

---

**Robert E. Hunter** is a senior adviser with RAND, Washington, D.C. He was U.S. ambassador to NATO from July 1993 to January 1998.

The cold war also represented the most sustained period of American engagement abroad in its history. Of course, the United States has always had a foreign policy, and it has been more or less constantly involved abroad since early in the twentieth century. Even during the interwar period, the United States was not in fact "isolated" from all events and engagements abroad. But except for Woodrow Wilson's abortive attempt to devise a lasting framework for both the United States and Europe after the First World War, it was only from the time of World War II that the United States began consciously to develop a grand strategy of involvement abroad and, in the process, a craft of thinking systematically about its role that was more than a short-term response to circumstances largely determined abroad. Even then, beyond the decisions required to conduct World War II—beginning with the "Europe first" commitment in the national battleplan—the United States still had only a fledging sense of longer-range purpose. That only began to develop with plans to create a United Nations, along with the Havana and Bretton Woods agreements to establish new institutions for organizing economic relations among states.

The great impetus for U.S. strategy-making, providing a more lasting sense of purpose than the finite goal of defeating the Axis powers, came from growing recognition of the twin challenges posed by the extension of Soviet power into Central Europe and the spread of communism, including its appeal in some West European states. Winston Churchill called the Marshall Plan of 1947 the "most unsordid act in the history of any nation," but it was also a strategic response to the vulnerability of European democracies to a rising, alien philosophy, backed by a major power that made no secret of its proselytizing intent. Through the North Atlantic Treaty, the European Recovery Program was soon buttressed by the formal engagement of U.S. strategic commitment, in response to a pervading sense that "recovery," both political and economic, might not succeed unless the peoples of Western Europe gained confidence that they could sustain their independence and freedoms in the face of the looming presence of the Soviet Union. With the onset of the Korean War, which seemed to prove that the Soviet Union would use military power to achieve its goals, the Western alliance put the "O" in NATO, the Soviet Union created a web of alliances in Central and Eastern Europe, and the cold war became militarized. Further evidence of the overarching nature of the East-West struggle came in the form of communism's triumph in China. And so the global political structure, at least as it engaged the great powers, became frozen.

All these events led the United States to assume new responsibilities and leadership—though few people at the time understood how "permanent" these were to become—including the need for a coherent strategy of engagement outside its borders. For the first time in its history, the United States had no choice but to create, articulate, embrace, gain foreign converts to, and build political support for a truly grand strategy. This challenge was made even more insistent by the development of history's most awesome military weapons, the atomic and then hydrogen bombs. Once the Soviet Union also began to acquire these weapons, the United States found itself directly and permanently vulnerable to foreign attack, to a degree it had never

before faced. Nuclear confrontation between Washington and Moscow ushered in an era without peer in human experience, in which all-out war could lead even to the destruction of life on the planet. Never before had the stakes in war been more consequential, or the need to prevent such a war from ever starting so critical.

## SPRINGTIME FOR STRATEGIC THOUGHT

It is not surprising, therefore, that there was a great flowering of American strategic thought from the late 1940s onward. This began with seat-of-the-pants judgments made by talented and insightful "amateurs," such as George Marshall, Dean Acheson, and John J. McCloy, who, in the 1940s, created the great postwar international institutions. Gifted individuals from the disciplines of economics, mathematics, and the natural sciences, like Bernard Brodie and Oscar Morgenstern, took up the work of devising strategy for the nuclear age in the 1950s. They were succeeded in the 1960s and later by a community of American experts who had been trained in strategy as a discipline in itself. Indeed, a whole generation of strategic analysts, both in the United States and elsewhere in the West, emerged to meet the demands imposed by the awful, unprecedented dangers of the cold war.

At the same time, new institutions were created across America to conduct research into and devise responses to new challenges. Some of these institutions were seated in corporations, some within universities, and some as stand-alone bodies that came to be known, generically, as "think tanks." This new strategic community of experts and institutions developed links across the United States and into allied and other states abroad. A minor doctrine from the classic management of military power— deterrence of another state's actions—became vitally important, indeed the cornerstone of strategic thought and action on the part of both nuclear superpowers, so much so that they both worked to ensure that each understood the implications of this deterrent doctrine. Thus the United States developed the critical doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), and the Soviet Union implicitly embraced it. The two superpowers also pursued arms control together, less as a means of reducing weapons than as a shared experience in learning how to prevent conflict.

Of course, nuclear strategy and arms control did not develop by themselves as an exercise in pure, abstract reasoning. Intense interest also arose about other applications of military power, as well as about many of the world's regions, embracing a wide range of disciplines. In parallel, deeper inquiry was made into the workings of the global economic system, both for its own sake and as an essential element of providing, for the West, the sinews of defense.

In general, the United States became profoundly engaged intellectually in the outside world, as a function both of far-reaching inquiry, provoked at first by cold war threat and challenge, and of the exponential growth of direct experience. Communications and media led to an explosion in available information; travel abroad became more accessible, both to and from America; and a host of new journals was launched to provide outlets for analysis, in addition to the increasing reach of more popular media.

It is no wonder, then, that systematic and informed study and instruction in international politics and economics blossomed in America, as did interaction with different cultures and values. Much of this fed into the continued development and refinement of basic U.S. strategy and engagement abroad. This was, of course, uneven as regards different parts of the world. Genuine strategic analysis—as opposed to other disciplines like area studies and its offshoots—tended to focus on regions and problems judged most vital to U.S. interests. Thus most prominence in strategic thought was given to the Soviet Union, Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, plus, from time to time, specialty areas like Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. And while many Americans became interested in other regions that were not focal points of the cold war—like the Indian subcontinent, much of Africa, and virtually all of Latin America—disciplines of study about these regions rarely produced strategists, nor did the literature on them abound with strategic analysis. Thus in 1984, this author was tasked by the U.S. Bipartisan Commission on Central America to provide strategic analysis for that region, yet was hard-pressed to find a single American analyst who brought that particular perspective to bear.

One effect of this uneven approach to the world—with strategic analysis reserved largely for those areas judged most important in East-West competition—was the dearth of efforts to compare and contrast relationships and policies from one region to another. Strategy, as a discipline, tended to be "top down"—that is, a response to the cold war challenge—rather than "bottom up," an accretion of knowledge and elaboration of choices that derived from individual events and regions and was then developed, to the extent possible, into some systematic, conceptual whole. Regional studies had some currency, but there was little conversation among scholars, experts, and analysts from different regions or functional specialties—economists and military experts, social scientists and humanists—and even less of what might be called global studies and strategic analysis.

The failure of virtually all the experts to predict the end of the cold war thus came not just from the fact that its structure had become so compelling but also from the relative lack of systematic communication among different perspectives—whether regions, functional relationships (like economics), or disciplines. By the time the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989, the Soviet Union and its empire had long since passed the point when internal hollowing out, produced by social, economic, cultural, and political developments—most notably Gorbachev's *glasnost*—had passed the point of no return. But knowledge about impending events within the Soviet Union, which in retrospect was clearly there to be gleaned, was not properly organized and understood. In essence, there had been a general lack of the most basic aspects of a true grand strategy, the systematic and comprehensive integration of knowledge from multiple sources.

## BEYOND THE COLD WAR

The years since the end of the cold war—whose final demise can perhaps be dated from the formal collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991—have found

the United States facing a very different world. Not all is unique: the return to a more fluid state of international politics reflects less a novelty than a return to a "normal" global politics. But some of the change is certainly without precedent in U.S. if not also in modern world history. Most important, the United States has found itself possessing more power—latent, incipient, if not always actualized—that covers more areas of human activity—political, economic, military, and even cultural—than has been true of any other state or empire for centuries: perhaps since the end of the Roman Empire.

At the same time, in part because of its immense power, both absolute and relative to others, the United States finds itself facing less of a direct military threat than before Pearl Harbor. Even what seemed to be the permanent threat of nuclear annihilation, the "nuclear balance of terror" with the Soviet Union, has largely dissipated—not because the weapons have been dismantled but rather because the context of conflict has disappeared. And while other countries besides Russia also have nuclear weapons, in no case have political relations between the United States and another state deteriorated, as yet, into circumstances where it can fairly be said that the United States faces a nuclear threat. (This eventuality, however, is the centerpiece of much contemporary analysis about weapons of mass destruction and even the possibility of nuclear terrorism at some point in the future.)[1]

## The United States cannot escape the political and moral responsibilities conferred by power, even before will and intention are considered.

At first blush, this seemingly halcyon condition—great power and diminished imminent, direct threat—argues against the need for the craft of strategy. But such a posture ignores many questions, the most basic of which is how to preserve and extend the current situation of power and position—factors that are, in some measure, inextricably linked. This is not just a matter of what the United States does on its own, in terms of military forces, economic strength, effective democratic institutions, and a relatively cohesive society. It is also a matter of how the United States acts in relation to other states and entities. This concerns both how Washington will translate its power into influence and how it will sustain or create relationships with other centers of power, current or potential, that will enable the United States to remain relatively free from external threats—whatever form they may take.

### RESPONSIBILITY AND OPPORTUNITY

Part and parcel with this perspective are the issues of responsibility and opportunity. Power, it is often argued, confers responsibility; this is another way of saying that the age of American isolationism is certainly past. The United States has become more deeply engaged in the world in a host of ways—political, economic, cultural, and in terms of all the various types of communications, both real (travel) and virtual

(electronic)—such that retreat from the world has become inconceivable. Just as surely, the impact and influence of the United States will be considerable, whether or not as a consequence of policy: "America" as a pluralistic entity plays a multiplicity of roles and helps to shape, in greater or lesser degree, the circumstances, perspectives, and behavior of others. Thus, like every great power in history, the United States cannot escape the political and moral responsibilities conferred by power, even before issues of will and intention are considered.

At the same time, many other states and international institutions—especially in, but not limited to, the West—have long since come to depend upon both an active, essentially benign, American engagement and U.S. willingness to lead. This expectation did not end with the cold war, a fact viewed by many Americans as both a blessing and a curse. Even where, among a collection of other states interested in preserving relative freedom from threat and conflict, the United States might prefer that some other state take the lead, so far this is seldom the case.

But the U.S. role in the world should not just be seen as a conservative preservation of the status quo. It is better viewed as an opportunity to shape critical aspects of relations among states and within institutions, such that both the United States and others can have reasonable expectations that the future will provide more benefits than liabilities in international life. In some limited areas, the United States has already attempted to do this: in the modernization of NATO, in efforts (with others) to develop an expansionist and more open global trading regime, and in continued peace-making, including in places where there is no longer a cold war motive (e.g., the Middle East) or where U.S. impulses derive more from moral concerns than from requirements of power (e.g., Northern Ireland).

For the long term, probably most important is what the United States and other countries can and will do to create or modernize international institutions that can provide widespread benefits for their members. Institutional structures, practices, attitudes, and processes have a dual value: 1) to channel, reinforce, and perpetuate common interests and 2) to create an international environment that can bring lasting benefits to the United States, even if its present preeminence were to diminish.

## LESSONS FOR STRATEGY

For the United States, therefore, the craft of strategy—the creation of a basic framework for making informed choices about different courses of action—is just as important in the post–cold war world as it was before, if not more so. This does not relate to the narrow—though vital—dimension of nuclear strategy that dominated thinking and action during the time of U.S.-Soviet confrontation; but given that that factor is now absent, other areas of strategy take on their own importance. And it is in these areas—beyond the nuclear domain—that the requirements of strategic thought will be most important.

The challenge for the United States in developing a set of policies and practices for the twenty-first century is no less than to discover—or to rediscover—the basic art of thinking strategically about the rest of the world and to relate its many component

parts and different disciplines to one another, thus creating a better capacity to make choices among contending interests and possibilities. What follows is not an attempt to prescribe a policy focus for the United States in the years ahead, or even the precise dimensions for a grand strategy. It is rather a suggested approach to thinking about America's role abroad.

1. *Requiem for a paradigm.* It is important at the outset to understand that, unlike the cold war period, there will be no small group of overarching goals, no single paradigm, to provide direction for large elements of America's engagement abroad, or at least to set standards against which all policy must first be measured. Nor is any central theme in the offing, other than one that remains from the cold war period: that the U.S. retains an interest in leading a growing, global economy. There is, in fact, a "paradigm gap," an absence of unifying themes and perspectives that can link disparate regions as well as different disciplines together. This will continue to be the case for the foreseeable future, unless there emerges a new and globally oriented geo-political competitor or a new philosophy to challenge that of liberal democracy. None appears in the offing: Russia would be years if not decades away from reassuming such a role if it were so inclined. Even if China becomes an assertive power, it is most unlikely to have the global ambition and reach of the former Soviet Union. And, while it cannot safely be argued that the age of contending ideologies, such as marked most of the twentieth century, is firmly past, none seems likely to appear, despite the continued existence of immense social and economic challenges. "Globalization" may prove disruptive in many countries and even across regions, but so far it does not seem to have the potential for spawning great contenders for power or organization of societies like communism and fascism.

Instead of being subject to judgment in terms of a few key goals or a central paradigm, therefore, choices regarding U.S. foreign policy will be far more complex than during the cold war; and choices about different regions will to a significant degree have to be made in terms of the particular conditions of those regions, without basic connections to events elsewhere that are imposed by some overarching global framework. The geopolitical world is, and will largely remain, fragmented—though this does not also mean that the parts will be isolated from one another.

2. *New thoughts for a new system.* This lack of a unifying paradigm does not relieve the United States of the burdens of making choices and tradeoffs, of deciding where to be involved and where to abstain, what resources to commit, what risks to run, or the particular instruments to be employed in advancing national interests. Indeed, if anything, there is a greater need for systematic thought than during the cold war, not because of the absolute level of challenge to U.S. security, prosperity, and position (nothing is likely to rival the intensity of threat posed by nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union) but because the lack of a basic paradigm requires greater craft in analysis, in more dimensions, than before. With complexity comes a heightened need for understanding to make sense of both the parts and the whole of U.S. foreign policy.

The situations confronting U.S. policymakers are diverse. Several stand out, including the future of Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union; the direction and

scope of China's internal change and external ambitions; the spread of military technologies; the specter of terrorism; relations among the principal states of the Indian subcontinent; and continued challenges within the Middle East and its environs, ranging from the Balkans and Greece-Turkey-Cyprus through the zone of Arab-Israeli conflict to the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan. In general, new strategic equations are found throughout the regions listed above. Clearly, strategic analysis will be at a premium.

3. *Connecting the dots.* While each region will need to be understood in its own terms, it remains true that each cannot be isolated from others. In some aspects of engagement, especially in economic and financial involvement, there are many interconnections mandated by the growth of a global marketplace, the speed with which financial resources can be shifted, and the increased interdependence that technology has created for global commerce, in both tangible and intangible goods and services, capital, and—with limitations—labor. Even where regional developments in terms of issues like politics and security must be dealt with in their own terms, when it comes to making choices—and especially in regard to devoting time, attention, leadership, and resources—the United States must have some means for relating one region to another. This is true even beyond the natural interconnections and intercourse between contiguous regions and the new demands placed on analysis of, say, the emergence of a Eurasian strategic context that did not exist in full measure during the cold war. Interconnections will be more subtle and will require an enhanced understanding of the ways in which a policy or event in Country A will affect Country B halfway around the world.

These developments imply an increased burden on U.S. analysis and development of strategic perspectives not only within but also across regions. This has often proved to be a limitation in American pedagogy—where area studies can go to great depth but often do not apply systematic tools of strategic thinking or fully comprehend the burdens of making choices within a broader compass. While looking for a unifying paradigm is an illusion at one extreme, thinking of the world as largely atomized is an illusion at the other.

## While looking for a unifying paradigm is an illusion at one extreme, thinking of the world as largely atomized is an illusion at the other.

4. *All dressed up and no place to intervene?* Clearly, the United States is not prepared simply to exploit its position as the only remaining superpower to impose its will. To a significant degree, the reverse has been true: the concept of a "peace dividend," which is about psychology and politics more than about economics or military instruments, has led the United States both to devote less of its gross domestic product to international affairs and to run fewer risks in the use of military power, especially when acting without allies. The latter has led to a "paradox of military supremacy"—evident, for example, in places like Iraq and the former Yugoslavia. In

the latter case, the United States, along with its NATO allies, judged that Kosovo was worth its engagement, but only if allied combat fatalities could be kept to an absolute minimum. Along with severe limitations on the use of economic resources in trying to shape the outside world and America's place in it, this reflects what could be expected in a democracy at a time when external threats seem, at least relatively, to be meager or at least not imminent.

But this argument implies more intense analysis about the use of those resources that are employed in foreign policy, and a sense of relationship and tradeoffs—especially to relate to one another the elements of the great classic triad of power and policy: diplomacy, economics, and military force. Yet this method historically has not been particularly prevalent in U.S. strategic thought. Certainly, during the cold war, the relationship of these three elements was that of a hierarchy, where military power (containment and deterrence) took primacy, while diplomatic and economic relationships were relegated to an inferior place. It is striking, for example, that there is now a common understanding that security in Europe, defined in its broadest sense, is a compound of political, economic, and military elements, including in Central Europe and with regard to Russia, as practiced by NATO and the European Union, as institutions. Yet a similar relationship characterized the period in the late 1940s before the cold war in Europe was rigidified. In the wake of the cold war's end, an earlier understanding of security as a comprehensive phenomenon has reemerged; but in order to make policy effective on the basis of such an understanding, in Europe and elsewhere, there also has to be systematic study, analysis, and strategic choice that takes this method fully into account.

## NATO intervention in the Balkans paid a debt to the past as well as to the future.

5. *Beyond the triad.* The relationship between different perspectives—including the role of economics, which is so often neglected—thus becomes critical. But so does the rebalancing of different elements of policy that go beyond the classic triad, as traditionally understood, to create a method of factoring in—that is, for choosing—other elements that are less palpable but are certainly consequential. For example, within analysis of a new range of opportunities for the United States abroad, no element is more remarkable for its rising importance—in pedagogy and in policy—than efforts to expand the number of countries that can be counted within the community of democratic nations. There is no doubt that the United States is a proselytizer in this regard: nor is this necessarily unique to America, since there is something inherent in democracy and its link to human aspirations that has universal appeal, even if its practical expression can take many forms. Allied to this effort is also the promotion of human rights, in at least two of its three central aspects: security of the person and political rights, if not also economic rights. Of course, in the case of both democracy and human rights, theory still runs well ahead of practice, and consistency is not dominant in U.S. policy any more than in other states that espouse a commitment and ambition in this area. But even with that qualification, it remains true that

both aspirations have a deep moral quality; and that, with its current position of power, the United States is better placed to emphasize this quality than has been true at other times, as it strikes a balance in the equation that historically has placed power and principle in opposition to one another. The challenge in terms of strategy is to factor this quality into overall perspectives and to develop means of making choices and—where possible—resolving dilemmas that inevitably arise between value and power objectives.

This point is consistent with the steady growth of a moral dimension to international politics, especially since the end of the Second World War, including a number of international conventions, beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Thus in the former Yugoslavia, the Western countries, primarily through NATO, were finally motivated to act to stop conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo not because of any risk of escalation to a wider war but because of the compelling moral issues that the conflicts presented. There was a double cause: recognition, however long in coming, of a collective responsibility to help stop the most massive and brutal killing in Europe since World War II—a debt to the past—as well as an understanding that only by responding in this fashion could NATO itself gain the political and moral legitimacy and support it must have to perform other functions in trying to create a Europe "whole and free"—a debt to the future.

By the same token, U.S. strategic thinking also has to take account of other factors that do not relate easily to power, at least in a narrow sense. Thus there needs to be a method for responding to the interests and concerns of societies that were once lumped together, in a cold war expression, as the Third World, and generally treated as objects of great-power politics rather than as subjects in their own right. In particular, there is a need to develop a basis for providing support to countries in Africa and parts of Asia and Latin America that do not figure prominently in geopolitics but where human need is so great: in essence, advancing economic human rights. Other elements, such as the global environment, also need a place in the overall method of strategic thinking, so that their significance can be given due weight in analyzing policy choices.

In sum, a hallmark of American power, position, and values should be advancement of moral and other nonpower qualities in strategic analysis, not as an afterthought but as an essential element of thought, choice, and action.

## Moral qualities should be an essential element of thought, choice, and action.

6. *Institutional involvement.* Developing a wide-ranging strategic method imposes requirements on American institutions. This includes the way in which international relations is taught in colleges and universities, the approach followed in research think tanks, and the dialogue carried out in journals and in the public and private councils that consider the U.S. role in the world. These are supplementary requirements: not replacing the old methods, but adding a strategic dimension that asks the most difficult questions and searches for answers that are not bound by old convention and

perspective. This is not easily done, and the craft of strategic thinking is not widely taught in the United States. This helps to explain why, more than ten years after the end of the cold war, the broad lines of future U.S. foreign policy are still fuzzy, why so much of current dialogue is still an extension of the past rather than a truly fresh look at new conditions, circumstances, relationships, and possibilities.

7. *Breaking bad habits.* Lastly, the American academic community has a special responsibility in its method of approach. During the cold war, a large part of that community became actively engaged in the world of policy—turning insights and analysis into practical recommendations for action. This certainly enriched understanding within government, but it also tended to atrophy basic skills of analysis and understanding about history, culture, psychology, economics, and politics that did not have policy and power as their end. It is necessary to increase the separation between basic strategic analysis and practical policy—especially policy made and conducted in a partisan environment—in order to permit a leap of understanding beyond a cold war framework or any other framework that is compelling, not so much because, on renewed investigation, it proves to be intellectually sound but because it has become habit. Thinking "outside the box" does not come from willing a creative approach to policy, but rather from approaching analysis in the first place without a policy objective in view, and certainly without active engagement in policy debate. In that way fresh perspective and insight can become available to those who translate this understanding into policy choices.

These ideas for rethinking the craft of foreign policy are not exhaustive. But they can help to illuminate the different environment in which consideration of America's role in the world needs to take place. They are steps toward a method of strategic thinking capable of underpinning the successful engagement of the United States abroad, in its own interests and—if America is wise—in the interests of a large and growing number of other states and peoples as well.

## Notes

[1] See, for instance, Ian O. Lesser et al., "Countering the New Terrorism," RAND Corp., MR-9898-AF, 1998; and Martin Libicki, "Rethinking War: The Mouse's New Roar?" *Foreign Policy,* Winter 1999–2000, pp. 30–43.

*International Approaches to Development*
# The United Nations and Its Limits

by Jacques Fomerand

The challenges of the post–cold war era—regional conflicts, civil wars, poverty, threats to the environment, and an increasingly globalized and differentiated world economy—underscore the necessity of international cooperation in the forthcoming decades. In fact, the potential range of possible UN interventions in the fields of sustainable economic development and the promotion of human rights and social welfare is virtually unlimited. Sobering realities, however, point to the need for more prudential expectations.

One such consideration relates to the resources available to the organization. They are by no means negligible. The budget of the United Nations for 2001–2002 slightly exceeds $2.5 billion, a rather astonishing figure when compared to the $27 million budget voted by the General Assembly in 1946. Total UN technical cooperation assistance delivered in 1998 amounted to more than $5 billion, another remarkable figure in light of the fact that there is no specific injunction in the UN Charter mandating the organization to work in the technical cooperation field.[1] In fact, the wide spectrum of current UN development activities, largely unanticipated in 1945, is testimony to the plasticity of the charter and to the capacity of the organization to adapt itself to its changing environment.

## THE RESOURCE GAP

Yet, in relative terms, the UN's allocations seem inadequate to the tasks at hand. With 188 member states, its budget for the next biennium provides $268 million for international cooperation and development, $347 million for activities of the regional commissions, and $123 million for human rights activities.[2] In contrast, the twenty-nine member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) now allocate some $55 billion to development cooperation. The World Bank has loaned almost $400 billion since it started operations in 1946. In 1995, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) extended to Mexico a credit of nearly $18 billion and to Russia more than $6.2 billion. To contain and roll back the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the IMF committed about $35 billion to Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand. Since 1992, the fund has lent Russia close to $40 billion. Even more dwarfing are the flows of private finance to developing countries, which amounted to an estimated $166 billion in 1998.[3]

---

**Jacques Fomerand** is director of the North America Office, United Nations University (UNU). The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations or the UNU.

51

The magnitude of the continuing challenges in developing areas further under-lines the gap between resources and needs.[4] Significant strides have been made in the past half-century throughout most developing regions. But these achievements—in large part attributable to the now much debunked "statist" developmental policies of the postwar decades—offer little ground for complacency. Poverty and deprivation remain the hallmark of life in developing regions. Approximately 1 to 1.3 billion people live in "absolute poverty"—that is to say, on less than a dollar a day. About one-fourth of the developing countries' population is still chronically undernour-ished. Child mortality rates are ten times higher than in the North. One-third of the people living in the least developed of the developing countries are not expected to reach forty years of age. The number of adults who cannot either read or write today roughly remains equivalent to what it was in 1980 (877 million). One billion people still lack access to clean water, nearly two billion have no adequate sanitation, and two billion have yet to be reached by electric power. In addition, surging globalization of the world economy is leading to an increasing concentration of income resources and wealth. In this context, all indicators point to a world that is becoming more rather than less polarized, and a continuing and expanding North-South "economic apart-heid" in the twenty-first century is not an unrealistic scenario. The process of global-ization has also accelerated the development of a two-track global economy (which the OECD warned of more than a decade ago) by sharpening differences in economic performance between the "speedies" (countries with fast growth, such as the newly industrialized countries of Asia) and the "needies" (economies that are stagnating or regressing, as is the case in a large number of African countries).[5]

The eradication of poverty and the acceleration of human development—no longer unreasonable objectives—do, of course, have a price tag. At the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, it was suggested that $125 billion in development assistance—in effect, a doubling of total flows of official development assistance—would be neces-sary to supplement, each year, domestic resources for the implementation of Agenda 21,[6] a broad plan of action adopted at the 1992 Rio conference defining norms and principles for a wide range of environmental and development issues. Similarly, the Cairo Conference on Population and Development in 1994 determined that making health and family planning universally accessible in 2015 would require an estimated $17 billion for the year 2000 and more than $21 billion per year by 2015, thus implying a more than threefold increase in international population assistance levels.[7] The 1998 *Human Development Report* estimates that the additional annual invest-ment cost to achieve basic social services for all would amount to approximately $40 billion ($6 billion for education, $9 billion for water and sanitation, $12 billion for reproductive health, and $13 billion for basic health and nutrition).[8]

At the same time, the resources available for development cooperation are de-creasing. The pattern of "aid fatigue" already apparent in the 1980s has not slackened, as evidenced by the continuing shrinking of official development assistance (ODA) of the OECD countries, which as a percentage of GDP fell to 0.25% in 1996 and 0.22% in 1997, a drop of more than 20% from 1992 levels.[9] In spite of some tenta-tive signs of an upturn in ODA, the shortfalls have not been compensated for by

international financial flows, the bulk of which, in any case, goes to the more dynamic economies of the developing world rather than needy low-income countries.[10] On the bilateral level, the case of the United States, once the world's leading lender, is a telling one. In 1956, the United States accounted for almost 63% of all foreign assistance in the world, against about 17% in 1993. U.S. ODA represented only 0.12% of GNP in 1996 and 0.08% in 1997.[11]

Not surprisingly, the share of UN system development grants in declining total ODA has dropped in nominal terms, affecting virtually all UN voluntary programs. Thus, from a peak of $1.1 billion in 1992, the resources of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) plummeted to $740 million in 1998. Voluntary contributions to the United Nations Population Fund fell from $293 million in 1996 to $268 million in 1998. Funding for the World Food Programme shrank from $1.7 billion in 1992 to $1.1 billion in 1998.

Under such circumstances, expectations about the developmental contributions of the United Nations—past, present, or future—cannot give rise to romantic flights of fancy. Hyperbolic statements about the "unique," "central," "critical," and "leadership" role of the organization in international cooperation for development abound. The bare facts point to more prosaic realities, and it is perhaps not inopportune here to recall that no government ever seriously entertained the idea of designing an organization that would operate as or evolve into an independent institutional actor. Nor was it ever envisaged to endow the United Nations with "regulatory," supranational, and autonomous decision-making powers in the field of development or the management of the world economy. Such powers, overshadowed by the political and economic weight of the United States, were in fact reserved, under strict conditions, for the Bretton Woods institutions.[12] As a voluntary association of nation-states and pending the improbable coming of a transcendental political development, the function assigned to the United Nations was simply to act as a mechanism "placed at the disposal of states, which may use it for whatever purposes their agreements or their disagreements dictate."[13] There is no dearth of painful reminders—including the experience of the 1970s with Third World clamors for a New International Economic Order—underlining the fact that whenever the United Nations did venture too far beyond these boundaries, trouble immediately lurked on the horizon.

## Expectations about the developmental contributions of the United Nations cannot give rise to romantic flights of fancy.

The key question to be asked about the UN's developmental role is not so much what is permissible under the charter but rather what the member states—especially the major stakeholders—are ready to underwrite.[14] Under these conditions, one may expect the organization to continue serving as a forum for the discussion and promotion of international cooperation for development. As the "town meeting of the world," and political circumstances permitting, the United Nations may indeed act as a catalyst, a facilitator, or a conveyor in concert with national and international actors—regional bodies, nongovernmental organizations, civil-society entities—possibly con-

tributing thereby to greater coherence, complementarity, and coordination in economic policymaking at the global level.

Within this broad framework, one can anticipate that the UN system will remain actively involved in activities that could be labeled as "functionalist," very much in line with the thinking and expectations of the New Deal–conscious drafters of the charter.[15] After modest and slow beginnings, the United Nations is firmly saddled in the business of technical assistance, now rechristened "capacity building." In fact, the range and diversity of UN operations (as well as their share in the organization's expenses) have grown exponentially as a result of the growing complexity of the activities—humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, advocacy, and "postconflict peace building"—that the United Nations has been called upon in recent years to carry out in support of peace. The process has posed—indeed, is posing—major challenges of a conceptual, organizational, managerial, and administrative nature, and the response of the system has infrequently risen much above its prevailing pattern of disjointed incrementalism. But in spite of increasingly constraining, declining flows of multilateral assistance, the demand for UN operational work is not lessening, and one may expect the organization to deepen and sharpen its operational involvement in the field.

## SETTING THE WORLD'S AGENDA

Together, the components of the UN system—the specialized agencies, the IMF, the World Bank, and the many funds and programs—gather, generate, develop, harmonize, distill, analyze, and disseminate dizzying volumes of economic and social information about such varied subjects as statistics, civil aviation, health, intellectual property, telecommunications, trade and shipping, population, and social questions. This steady stream of data compilation and analytical work is another important service that the organization will continue to provide to the international community. Its significance cannot be underestimated, as it constitutes the basis for the development, maintenance, and progressive expansion of technical standards, rules, and regimes, which have made possible and sustained the expansion of international economic and commercial transactions. Examples of such unexciting and unheralded but indispensable "public goods" produced by the UN include the development of a common language with regard to economic statistics by the UN Statistical Commission, the definition of labor standards and human rights programs by the International Labor Organization, the determination of criteria for pharmaceutical quality by the World Health Organization, conventions and agreements negotiated in the framework of the International Civil Aviation Organization regarding commercial airline routes, appropriate practices concerning air navigation and border crossing procedures, and so forth; the list is endless.[16]

Through its studies and reports, the United Nations has not infrequently drawn the attention of the world community to emerging questions that required its attention. The very concept of development, which is hardly mentioned in the charter, is a case in point. Strategic considerations linked to the cold war and the rise of Third

World countries in the international arena were unquestionably determinant factors in the growing involvement of the United Nations in development questions. But this political process was in no marginal way fed by the policy research work of distinguished economists in the Economic Commission for Latin America and the UN Secretariat.

## The key question about the UN's developmental role is not what is permissible under the charter but what member states are ready to underwrite.

Despite its limited resources, the UN system has often been out in front on issues pertaining to development. The censuses carried out by the Population Division of the UN Secretariat in the 1950s provided the first tangible evidence of the massive demographic explosion affecting the planet. Later, in the 1980s, the authors of the World Economic Survey were among the first to warn that developing countries had in fact become net exporters of capital. Citing history and the Great Depression to buttress their case, UN studies now warn about the double-edge sword of globalization, express doubts about the capacity of markets to meet societal expectations, and stress the need for policies promoting broad social concerns as a complement of free-market forces. For example, UNEP's recently released *Global Environment Outlook 2000* focuses attention on the socio-economic and political underpinnings of environmental problems and warns that the "unsustainable progression of extremes of wealth and poverty (in the world) threatens the stability of the whole human system, and with it the global environment."[17]

In some cases, these "early warnings" have not gone unnoticed and have paved the way for agenda building. The UN global conferences held throughout the 1990s contributed to significant shifts in thinking, as they focused attention on the holistic nature of the development process. They also heightened interest as well as political concern for environmental protection and, most important, for societal concerns and the social impact of macroeconomic policies. Similar preoccupations underpin the more recent UN analyses of the vulnerability of developing countries and transitional economies to financial volatility and contagion. Calls for an international financial conference under the aegis of the United Nations—long resisted by major industrial countries—are no longer politically unrealistic.

Indeed, the Bretton Woods institutions have not been immune to the steadfast barrage of empirical data contradicting established practices and advocating alternative policies. For a long time, the UN has taken the position that some measures of debt relief for debtor developing countries are necessary, which the Baker and Brady plans made little room for.[18] In June 1999, the Group of 7 major industrialized countries agreed in Cologne, Germany, to release the poorest highly indebted countries from debt servicing of up to $70 billion.[19] Stung by repeated attacks on their much heralded but woefully inadequate 1996 debt relief initiative for the heavily indebted poor countries, the World Bank and the IMF have made public their intent to strengthen it. Both bodies now also acknowledge the necessity of social safety nets, as

the prime objective of development is not only the acceleration of growth in developing countries but also the alleviation and eradication of poverty. UNICEF criticisms of the IMF in the mid-1980s and advocacy of structural adjustment programs "with a human face" were a major step in that direction.[20] The World Bank has gone further, apparently resurrecting John Maynard Keynes when it released in September 1999 a proposal for an international body to assist developing countries in managing commodity risk as part of an effort to reduce the impact of volatile price fluctuations in international commodity markets.[21]

In other instances, UN efforts at early warning have remained inconclusive or proved to be altogether disappointing. Unquestionably, the UN global conferences of the 1990s provided the setting for an extension and broadening of the empirical and normative work initiated by the UN in the 1950s, which had emphasized the importance of structural factors in the development process.[22] Some of the proposals emerging from these studies, such as the general system of preferences, were adopted by member states. Others, like the Common Fund of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) or the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development, fell into oblivion.

At the 1999 meeting of the World Economic Congress in Davos, Switzerland, UN secretary-general Kofi Annan proposed a global compact between the UN and the world business community, inviting the latter to promote universal norms in the areas of human rights, labor standards, and environmental practices.[23] Although some major businesses and organizations, such as the International Chamber of Commerce, have endorsed the secretary-general's initiative, it is too early to label it a success, especially in view of the decades-long history of adversarial and conflictual relations between the UN and the business community. Similarly, and notwithstanding the self-evident merits of the proposal, it is by no means sure that the international community will heed the secretary-general's calls for preventive policies in the introduction to his latest report on the work of the organization[24] or, more recently, at UNCTAD X, for a global New Deal and globalization with a human face.[25]

## CONCLUSION

Advocacy and norm-setting are an outgrowth of the universality of the UN. But the capacity of the organization to give its imprimatur over what is desirable and what is not is a function of its own legitimacy. While it is inevitable that certain member states may acquire a leadership role, it is of critical importance that the normative actions of the UN reflect as wide a political consensus as possible. The organization cannot become hostage to any single state or group of states without losing its credibility. In that context, the gyrations of the UN from a commitment to a politically bankrupt "New International Economic Order" to the currently prevailing but increasingly questioned "Washington consensus"[26] are a painful but necessary reminder that there are very sharp disagreements among member states as to the scope of UN authority, its mandated functions, and the breadth and modalities of its actions in the development field. The politically charged issue of a "North-South gap" for all prac-

tical purposes is off the international agenda. But it has not vanished, as only a handful of Southern countries can be said to be catching up economically with the North. There is not even consensus over the meaning of the concept of development. The protracted negotiations over a UN "agenda for development" did little to clarify the relative importance, on the one hand, of *sustainable development,* which includes good governance, human rights, and environmental protection and has the support of industrial countries, first and foremost the United States; and, on the other hand, *sustainable economic growth,* which developing countries see as a necessary precondition to development while considering such subjects as the environment, good governance, and human rights as yet new forms of conditionality imposed on them by the North. Likewise, the relationship between the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions, not to mention the policymaking role of the General Assembly and its jurisdiction over the rest of the system, remains an intractable source of contention between North and South. Current efforts to link human rights and development are also likely to place the UN on a collision course with some of its main stakeholders. In a vote on the question of a "right to development" in 1998, American representatives rejected the notion that "international macroeconomic policy making, globalization and debt relief are proper subjects for consideration in the various UN human rights fora."[27]

## The UN's development work is evolving between the high ground of moral principles and values and the numbing realities of political power.

The writing is on the wall. The United Nations may promote "capacity building," may encourage the development of functional regimes, and may produce studies and analyses leading to advice and advocacy. In the final analysis, though, none of these developmental functions can or, for that matter, should be taken for granted. Between the high ground of moral principles and values and the numbing realities of political power, the UN's developmental work for the past fifty years has evolved on a winding and tortuous road. Progress has often followed a cycle of regression and renewal. "International organization" is indeed a process, and an eminently political one at that, with all the contradictions and inconsistencies that this entails. For that reason, those who see the process as a unilinear one, either ascending or descending, are simply mistaken. Equally wrong are those who lambaste the organization as a bullying "nanny" or as an impotent mirror of world divisions. Perhaps this leaves little space to an organization seemingly composed of nagging siblings reminding each other of wrongs and rights. But if acting as the world's conscience has not overcome all the obstacles in the path to more widespread economic development, it has certainly helped shape a world that is somewhat farther along that path than it was fifty years ago. In that sense, the United Nations, while remaining an instrument of national policies, can also rise above the fray of politics and act as an indispensable mechanism for the collective legitimization of new norms, standards, and principles of universal application.[28]

## Notes

[1] Data on UN technical cooperation expenditures can be found in "Information on United Nations system regular and extrabudgetary Technical Cooperation Expenditures," UN Doc. DP/1999/35/Add. 1, July 26, 1999.

[2] United Nations, A/RES/54/250A.C, Feb. 9, 2000.

[3] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *World Investment Report 1999: Foreign Direct Investment and the Challenge of Development* (New York and Geneva: UN Publications, 1999).

[4] On this point, see UNDP, *Human Development Report*; and the World Bank, *World Development Report* (various issues).

[5] The statistical data are drawn from various issues of the World Bank's *World Development Report* and the UNDP's *Human Development Report*.

[6] United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, *Agenda 21* (New York: United Nations, 1992).

[7] Population and Development: Programme of Action Adopted at the International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, Egypt, Sept. 5-13, 1994, vol. 1. United Nations/UNFPA, 1995. Sales No. E.95.XIII.7.

[8] UNDP, *Human Development Report 1998* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 37.

[9] "Aid and private flows fell in 1997," OECD News Release, June 18, 1998 (available online: www.oecd.org/dac/htm/nw98-64a.htm).

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid. See also *Economic Perspectives* (an electronic journal of the U.S. Information Agency), Aug. 1996 (available online: http://www.usia.gov/journals/ites/0896/ijee/ej3toc.htm).

[12] On this point, see Georg Schild, *Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks: American Economic and Political Postwar Planning in the Summer of 1944* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995).

[13] Inis L. Claude, *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization,* 4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 445.

[14] To paraphrase the observation made long ago by Francis O. Wilcox and Carl M. Mercy in the context of the 1955 charter review in *Proposals for Changes in the United Nations* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1955), p. 227.

[15] For an insightful analysis of the influence of functionalist thinking on U.S. policymakers in the 1940s, see Anne Marie Burley, "Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State," in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 125–156. For a contemporary account of the "functional" approach to international relations, see David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (London: National Peace Council, 1946).

[16] For a useful overview of some of these functional tasks, see Mark W. Zacher, *The United Nations and Global Commerce* (New York: United Nations, 1999).

[17] Robin Clarke, ed., *Global Environment Outlook 2000* (London: Earthscan Publications, 1999).

[18] The Baker and Brady plans were two American initiatives seeking to come to terms with Third World indebtedness through growth-oriented debt restructuring arrangements rather than through IMF-inspired structural adjustment policies. The 1985 "Program for Sustained Growth" proposed by U.S. treasury secretary Baker involved new lending packages for debtors. The effort failed mainly because the proposal offered only $20 billion in additional financing to offset a $350 billion debt. The 1989 Brady Plan, named for the U.S. treasury secretary, did recognize the need for explicit, albeit limited, reductions, as it allowed debtor countries to buy back part of their outstanding debt at a discount or to convert it into securities with lower interest obligations or a reduced face value.

[19] For example, see "Report of G-7 Finance Ministers on the Cologne Debt Initiative to the Cologne Economic Summit, Cologne, 18–20 June 1999" (available online: http://www.colosseum.cz/archiv/clanky/c990624e.htm).

[20] Giovanni Andrea Cornia, Richard Jolly, and Francis Stewart, eds., *Adjustment with a Human Face,* 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).

[21] "Commodity Price Stabilization: A Proposal for Insurance and Price Stability," World Economic Developments (briefing notes by the Development Policy Analysis Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Sept. 1999), p. 4.

22 For a broad overview of the role of UN global conferences, see Jacques Fomerand, "UN Conferences: Media Events or Genuine Diplomacy?" *Global Governance,* vol. 2, 1996, pp. 361–375.

23 On the secretary-general's Davos initiative, see Georg Kell and John G. Ruggie, "Global Markets and Social Legitimacy: The Case of the 'Global Compact'" (paper presented at the conference on Governing the Public Domain Beyond the Era of the Washington Consensus? Redrawing the Line between the State and the Market, York University, Toronto, Ont., Canada, Nov. 4–6, 1999).

24 "Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization," General Assembly Official Records, 54th session, supp. 1, A/54/1.

25 "UN Chief Blames Rich Nations for Failure of Trade Talks," *The New York Times,* Feb. 13, 2000.

26 A set of economic prescriptions supported by the IMF and World Bank that has become the prevailing "conventional wisdom" about ways and means to promote the development of developing countries, and that calls for reliance on the market rather than the state. Typical measures advocated within the framework of the Washington consensus include a shift away from import substitution to open trade policies, the deregulation of financial markets for the promotion of foreign direct investment, and the privatization of state-owned enterprises.

27 Amb. Betty King, U.S. representative to the UN Economic and Social Council, "Statement in the General Assembly in Explanation of Vote on the Right to Development," USUN Press Release 232 (98), Dec. 9, 1998.

28 For a full discussion of the concept of "collective legitimization," see Inis L. Claude, *The Changing United Nations* (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 73–103.

*International Approaches to Development*
# Poverty Reduction and Institutional Change

by Robert Picciotto


> *No one can seriously question that a better quality of life for everyone is the*
> *unimpeachable universal goal of humanity.*
> *—Edward O. Wilson*

Poverty reduction is the overarching global policy challenge today. Poverty breeds despair, promotes social dislocation, adds to environmental stress, aggravates ethnic tensions, and engenders political instability. There can be no peace without equitable and sustainable development.

What new forms of organization are needed to meet the poverty-reduction challenge? How must organizations adapt to take account of the cultural context in which their activities will be carried out? What new concepts, instruments, and partnerships are best suited to tackling the poverty problem? And what are the implications for development assistance?

### CULTURAL ANTECEDENTS

Throughout history, inadequate food supplies have limited the size of human populations. Even in the now industrialized countries, the race between food production and nutritional needs remained close until the last century.[1] France, a relatively privileged rural economy, endured countless local famines and suffered a major countrywide famine an average of once every ten years from the tenth to the eighteenth centuries. The food situation was even more precarious in other parts of Europe.

The advent of productive agriculture required the abolition of serfdom and the advent of private farming, but it also entailed major investments in education and infrastructure, as well as sustained government action to promote technological change and create a national market for agricultural produce. This process is still under way in the developing world.

According to Deepak Lal,[2] the economic ascent of the West is due to fortuitous historical circumstances:

- the fragmentation of the Roman empire into a number of feudal states, each too weak to extract high rents without commensurate recognition of quasi-legal obligations vis-à-vis their subjects;

**Robert Picciotto** is director-general of operations evaluation at The World Bank, Washington, D.C. This paper is adapted from The 1999 Inaugural Wolf Lecture, presented by the author at The RAND Graduate School, Santa Monica, Calif., August 28, 1999.

- the invention of commercial law by mercantilist city-states, which facilitated the expansion of trade, nurtured the capitalist spirit, and promoted self-interested rationality in economic transactions;
- the Greek legacy of the self-governing city-state, which established the supremacy of the concept of citizenship over other forms of human association; and
- the promotion of the nuclear family system by papal decisions in the seventh century.

These innovations provided the cultural foundation for scientific invention, individual initiative, recognition by the state of private property rights, and the assumption of social responsibility for the old and destitute by the church and the state. Together, these cultural features promoted a social order consistent with restless economic innovation, market exchange, and social cohesion—until the most recent decline in religious values.

## Appropriate choice among institutional alternatives, taking account of the cultural context, is a critical ingredient of success.

Two competing views of the state eventually emerged. The first, inspired by the Greek city-state, is the *civil association*, under which the state acts merely as the custodian of laws that aim to facilitate individuals' pursuit of their own goals. The United States is the exemplar of this model. The second is the *enterprise association,* which legislates morality and seeks to use the law to achieve national goals.

The end result was that Europe originated a capitalist model of production grounded in *individualism,* while state-centered, *communalist* doctrines (and the extreme *collectivist* solutions of unchecked totalitarianism) dominated institutional development in the rest of the world. Development patterns in the West varied from country to country but had one thing in common—a judicious balance among the state, market, and civil society. Given their distinct traditions, the mix of the three sectors varied, but pluralism and built-in constraints against the predatory tendencies of the state were common traits among them all. By contrast, many developing countries have been characterized by weak private and voluntary sectors and an overextended and "soft" public sector.

### Today: Globalization

The global trends we are witnessing today are correlated with rapid technological change combined with inadequate institutional adjustment. With currencies floating against one another and global exchange markets now accounting for sixty times the volume of trade and investment flows, national economic policies have become constrained by the perceptions (and sometimes the whims) of private investors. Whereas business corporations (and some voluntary associations) have adapted to the new

economic geography—and indeed have encouraged its emergence—national institutions have had considerable difficulty keeping up with the historic shift.

Much of the world is now seeking to adopt market-friendly policies. However, relatively few countries have nurtured the norms and the complementary institutions needed to achieve harmonious connectivity to the global economy. The chronic instability associated with economic interdependence has favored countries with well-established market institutions. In parallel, given the growing global mismatch between economic and political organization, the new economic order has been characterized by a huge deficit in global public goods, penalizing those at the very bottom of the economic ladder.

## Global trends are correlated with rapid technological change combined with inadequate institutional adjustment.

To be sure, the impact of globalization has been highly differentiated. Most developed countries and a few developing countries (e.g., Taiwan, Chile, and Mauritius) have benefited. Continental and populous nations such as China and India were also able to make major strides in poverty reduction. Conversely, countries endowed with weak governance, limited skills, and fragile banking sectors have suffered major setbacks. In particular, much of Africa has been marginalized due to civil strife, policy weaknesses, adverse terms of trade, lack of domestic capacities, and excessive debt. The average African household consumes one-fifth less than it did twenty-five years ago.[3]

According to former U.S. secretary of labor Robert Reich, under globalization, "the gainers tend to be better educated, and have higher incomes. The losers tend to be worse educated and have lower incomes to begin with. They have the hardest time moving into the better-paying jobs."[4] This is the predicament of many poor countries that lie at the periphery of the global economy. As recently highlighted by Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, 700 million people living in 42 highly indebted poor countries are afflicted by "a combination of extreme poverty and financial insolvency which marks them for a special kind of despair and isolation."[5]

Knowledge-based services have replaced mass production as the major source of wealth. The advent of the information age—combined with major breakthroughs in the biological sciences—should help accelerate a shift towards sustainable development strategies. But this implies rapid institutional change to adapt to an integrated global ecology and an interdependent international economy.

According to Francis Fukuyama,[6] even in the industrial democracies, the transition toward a knowledge-based economy has involved a "great disruption," which has lasted for more than three decades and induced major dislocation in social bonds (due to the erosion of religious and community values) while at the same time generating extraordinary economic expansion and ecological stress. Whether the social order in the West is currently being reconstituted, as Fukuyama maintains, or has been irremediably damaged by the "anything goes" culture that emerged in the West during the 1960s, as prophesied by Lal, remains an open question.

Certainly, more emphasis on environmental protection and greater international solidarity will be required to achieve sustainable poverty reduction on a global scale. Without increased help from the developed world, the rapid transformation under way in developing countries will be far more disruptive and problematic than in the West. The resulting instability may even endanger the security of the planet. The cultural upheaval could be long lasting given the need to strengthen market institutions (still in their infancy in most developing and transition economies) while at the same time maintaining the communalist values needed for social cohesion.

The stakes are high. Without institutional adjustment, the social consensus on which sustained reform depends will break down, thus damaging a critical component of the ongoing globalization process. This happened earlier in the twentieth century, when the "creative destruction" that Joseph Schumpeter equated with rogue capitalism produced a backlash. The risk of history's repeating itself is not negligible, given the growing number of politicians (such as Le Pen in France, Buchanan in the United States, and Haider in Austria) who are exploiting public apprehension with market-oriented policies and preaching a return to interventionism and protectionism.

## POLICY DETERMINANTS

In terms of values, poverty reduction is hindered by a lack of individualism, a deficit in altruism—or a combination of both. The former gap cripples growth; the latter hinders equity. A deficit in group loyalty and hierarchy is also damaging to growth and equity. Most developing countries need capacity-building in all sectors—public, private, and voluntary. But for the required capacities to be built, an appropriate balance among government, the market, and civil society must be struck—both in the aggregate and at the level of microinstitutions.

Ironically, the policy basics of how poverty reduction can be secured are now solidly established. In terms of perceptions, the consensus that has been constructed during the past decade is an advance over the situation that prevailed when there was a misplaced free-market triumphalism in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union—let alone three decades ago, when central planning was still perceived as fundamental for economic and social development.

The essential conditions required for poverty reduction are no longer in dispute. Rapid economic growth is a prerequisite for substantial poverty reduction. It calls not only for sound and flexible macroeconomic management (the "Washington consensus") but also for a well-educated labor force, transparent and accountable government, an independent and credible judiciary, and a well-regulated financial sector. These are the requirements of entry in the new global economy. In order to translate intensive growth into sustainable poverty reduction, it is necessary to promote rural development and labor-intensive industries, provide equitable access to social services, construct resilient social safety nets, and create an environment-friendly regulatory framework. Thus, a new development consensus has emerged, and with it a new concept of capital (see Fig. 1).

**Fig 1.** *Unbundling the concept of capital.*

## THE NEED FOR INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTABILITY

The neoinstitutional perspective, conceived as a social learning process (see Fig.2), gives a special role to cultural factors. It incorporates institutional development and political participation within an integrated view of social transformation, giving pride of place to policy experimentation and objective evaluation of what does and does not work.

By screening information about the real world, mental constructs are critical to the creation and adaptation of social institutions (i.e., rules, norms, conventions, and organizations). Hence the critical importance of advocacy and opinion-making in human affairs—and the fundamental role of good public-policy advice. It is out of *ideas* about what is taking place in the real world that customs, incentives, organizations, and policies are shaped. These are the rules of the game that ultimately determine human interactions, aggregate economic performance, and who the winners and the losers will be.

Organizations and norms help to minimize transaction costs by increasing predictability in human behavior and generating trust. At the same time, they induce stability ("path dependence") in social protocols. Conversely, customs and rules can become dysfunctional when changes in the natural, technological, and/or demographic environment are frequent and/or large.

Societal beliefs and values may take generations to change. Consequently, the adequacy of the cultural context vis-à-vis existing factor endowments and evolving technological resources can be a powerful determinant of long-term economic performance. But even if the culture is flexible enough to accommodate adjustment, the policy response may not match the transformation of the external environment.

Difficult initial conditions, lack of public understanding, inadequate leadership, or the inability to resolve divergent interests can lead to inadequate policy responses. In addition, more often than not, inadequate social structures and/or misdirected institutional change come into play. Without judicious adjustment in social structures and institutions, a crisis eventually ensues; hence the relevance of periodic if not continuous redesign of policies and institutions.

**Fig. 2.** *Development as social learning.*

In certain circumstances, crises induce social learning—even as they destroy capital resources and cause great human hardship. Crises deliver tough policy messages, open up new modes of thinking, offer opportunities for fresh political and organizational leadership, and facilitate institutional adjustment. For example, it took a devastating world war to trigger the development crusade. The food crisis in the 1960s imposed changes in rural policies and ushered in the green revolution. The oil crisis of the 1970s shifted economic policies toward conservation and favored the ascent of the environmental movement.

Similarly, the debt crisis of the 1980s induced widespread adoption of market-oriented policies and accelerated the realignment of economic functions away from the state and toward the private sector and civil society. The most recent crisis, which started in Thailand in 1997 and spread to the rest of East Asia, Russia, and Brazil, provided dramatic confirmation that hooking up to the mighty engine of the global economy involves major benefits but also unprecedented risks—unless institutional conditions are adjusted to promote effective resource allocation and social cohesion. What distinguishes the latest crisis from its predecessors is that it has brought to light fundamental implications for the development business. Just as technology-driven economic interdependence operating in a borderless world introduced microeconomic changes within the policies and structures of international business firms, new development concepts, instruments, and relationships will need to be forged to achieve global poverty reduction. Appropriate choice among institutional alternatives, taking account of the cultural context, is a critical ingredient of success.

## BEYOND GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS

Let us turn our attention to the relative capacity of alternative forms of organization to achieve defined public-policy goals. What I propose is a scheme that considers civil society as a distinct organizational alternative—alongside government and the market. There are empirical grounds for introducing this third institutional dimension.

Political liberalization and the advent of new information technologies underlie the emergence of globally interconnected private voluntary associations. Given the limits of governments and markets, accurately documented by Charles Wolf, Jr.,[7] these organizations are increasingly active in shaping public opinion, delivering services to the poor, and mediating between government and citizenry in the design of public policies.

Voluntary associations have had a long tradition of public action in the United States—as Alexis de Tocqueville observed in his travels across the young republic. What is new is the growing clout of nongovernmental organizations in the developing world. According to Lester M. Salamon, director of the Center for Civil Society Studies at Johns Hopkins University, the rise of citizen-led organizations "will prove to be as momentous a feature of the late 20th century as the rise of the nation-state was of the late 19th century."[8] Twenty years ago, only one nongovernmental organization was concerned with environmental protection in Indonesia; today there are more than two thousand.[9] In Slovakia, where only a handful of such organizations existed in the 1980s, there are now more than ten thousand. In the Philippines, the number of registered nonprofit organizations grew from eighteen thousand to fifty-eight thousand between 1989 and 1996.[10]

## Hooking up to the mighty engine of the global economy involves major benefits but also unprecedented risks—unless institutional conditions are adjusted.

On the other hand, social capital may not have increased as much as suggested by these statistics, since traditional forms of self-organization have lost considerable influence while scarce cultural assets have been allowed to deteriorate. Furthermore, free riding is a severe problem for large voluntary groups. Small, privileged, well-funded constituencies are often extraordinarily effective at advocacy, and this is not always used in the public interest. Lack of accountability can be a problem too, especially where the regulatory framework for nonprofit organizations is weak. Lastly, the dark side of self-organization can be discerned in racist and exclusionary groups. Thus, the voluntary sector is not necessarily a superior alternative to the private sector or the public sector, as it too suffers from distinctive limitations. Accordingly, the power of the civil society needs to be balanced by the workings of the market as well as the regulatory environment of the state.

### PROMOTING GLOBAL POVERTY REDUCTION

While seeking to accelerate institutional adjustment, special difficulties associated with globalization need to be recognized. While most politics is local, economics is increasingly global. The mismatch between political sovereignty and economic interdependence arises from the successful adaptation of the business sector to the borderless economy and the lack of effective global governance regulating private enterprise.

The growing role of corporate cross-border capital and trade transactions (combined with the need for companies to adopt global strategies in order to compete) has created a global public-policy gap.[11] During 1985–1995, foreign direct investment grew at 16% annually, compared to 2 and 7% for output and trade, respectively. The combined value of global trade and foreign direct investment only accounts for six days of turnover on the global exchange markets.

Through the fusion of markets and the free movement of goods and capital across borders, territoriality (on which the nation-state relies for control) has become irrelevant for a wide range of economic decisions. The volatility of exchange rates and the chronic recurrence of financial crises flow directly from this state of affairs. Lacking the exit option available to capital and knowledge, labor has seen its competitive advantage severely eroded. Conversely, knowledge and capital have secured higher rewards.

In addition to bearing the burden of financial crises, the poor have been penalized in other ways. They have been disproportionately affected by natural disasters and are especially vulnerable to civil strife, ethnic divisions, and regional conflicts. Without adequate access to health care, they have fallen prey to new diseases—and old ones as well. Lastly, they have been severely affected by the stress imposed on common property resources.

For global strategies to succeed, it is no longer feasible to rely exclusively on national programs. If severe financial crises persist, it is because of inadequate international standards and mechanisms to prevent and mitigate them. If global environmental problems are becoming more serious, it is less because of a deficit in beliefs and values (opinion surveys regularly highlight the popularity of environmental protection) than because of the collective-action dilemmas that stand in the way of balancing the costs and benefits of conservation. Institutional adjustment will need to take place at the global as well as the country level.

In particular, if global poverty trends continue to worsen, it will be because the current development system has not been reengineered. The solution to the global poverty crisis lies in articulating new concepts, deploying new instruments, and forging new partnerships both at country and at global levels.

Specifically, with the advent of the global knowledge economy, countries that have not invested in human capital or that have failed to create market institutions will have to undergo a wrenching transformation—or risk joining the growing ranks of failed and failing states. Supporting the vital transition towards prosperity in the new economic order is the central challenge of development assistance. Therefore, under the *Comprehensive Development Framework*[12] initiative of James D. Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank, poverty reduction is being sought through a holistic, results-oriented approach to development with a special focus on improved governance (see Fig. 3). This initiative, which is being piloted in thirteen developing countries, emphasizes domestic ownership of policy reform; partnerships among government, the private sector, and voluntary agencies; and a results orientation in development assistance.

## New Concepts

Just as a modern business sets its corporate goals consistently with the authorizing environment, the competencies of the corporation, and market competition, it behooves any developing country to take a long view of its potentials and aspirations and to do so realistically, taking account of the regional context and global factors.

Clean Government
Sound Judiciary
Macroeconomic Management

Financial Sector
Power
Water

Health
Education
Transport

Social Dev.
Culture
Gender

Private Sector Development

National Resource Management
Rural Development
Urban Development

**Fig. 3.** *The Comprehensive Development Framework.*

Poverty-reducing programs take time to create, social protection policies require time to take root, and it may take a generation or more to overhaul the human capital base and implant the skills and the organizations needed for equitable and sustainable development. Under the Comprehensive Development Framework initiative, through improved aid coordination, poor countries will receive the advisory services they need to design long-term poverty-reduction strategies focused on results.

A results orientation is fundamental. Civil-service reform and improvements in the management of public expenditures are essential components of poverty-reduction strategies. They aim at shifting the focus of government toward the effective provision of services to its citizenry. In this context, poverty-reduction programs make clear distinctions among inputs, outputs, outcomes, and impacts. Performance indicators are collected and help monitor program implementation.

Modern poverty-reduction programs are *participatory:* they involve the private sector and civil society. Where globalization is perceived as a threat, the preservation of cultural heritage can be achieved through hybrid organizational arrangements combining private financing for tourism facilities with special financial assistance to poor residents to upgrade their dilapidated housing, as well as appropriate investments and safeguards directed at preserving cultural specificity and historic value. Similarly, introduction of property rights and involvement of farmers' associations can help promote sustainable cultivation and forestry practices.

The provision of infrastructure is no longer the exclusive province of the public sector. For example, the enabling environment can be adjusted to shift power services from the public sector toward the private sector by conceiving of them as toll goods; making use of new technologies that favor small-scale generation (e.g., gas-fired turbine generators); and designing networking policies (dissociating distribution from production) that enhance competition, promote the involvement of local communi-

ties, and facilitate access to the services by the poor. Similarly, trading of pollution rights can make use of market principles to achieve abatement levels in a more cost-effective way than command and control regimes.

## NEW INSTRUMENTS

Change in the rationale of development assistance from an instrument of geo-politics to an important concomitant of global economic integration—with special emphasis on poverty reduction—has already led to diversification of the development assistance toolkit.

Increasingly, development assistance is moving away from the fulfillment of resource transfer targets toward the nurturing of new policy ideas, the sharing of development knowledge across countries, and the promotion of domestic capacity. Greater selectivity is being practiced to ensure that assistance flows are directed to countries committed to policy reform and poverty reduction.

Evaluation results confirm that the overall policy and institutional environment has as much influence on project outcomes as project-specific factors. A major improvement in development practice has taken place with the use of participatory country-assistance strategies prepared by the countries themselves in consultation with the private sector and elements of civil society. Such inclusive strategies offer the promise of connecting projects with policy reform and technical assistance with institutional development. In certain circumstances, programmatic forms of assistance are used to improve coherence among development partners and to reduce aggregate transaction costs.

## NEW PARTNERSHIPS

The poverty problem is in part a classic problem of public-goods underproduction. The need for participation in the provision of public goods is even greater once the global dimension of the problem is recognized.

The current aid-delivery system is characterized by excessive fragmentation, frequent duplication, and high transaction costs. It is isolated from the most dynamic and powerful elements of the global economy—the private sector and the voluntary sector. Global poverty-reduction targets have been set, but they have not been linked to results-oriented alliances among governments, the private sector, and civil society.

New partnerships are urgently needed to deal with transnational problems—in support of debt relief, postconflict reconstruction, humanitarian crisis prevention, preservation of cultural heritage, environmental protection, disease surveillance and prevention, and science and technology development. Models for such programs exist: mission-oriented international collaborative programs have proven effective in disease surveillance and eradication, as has scientific research along the lines pioneered by the World Bank and its UN partners with respect to river blindness and international agricultural research.[13]

At the country level too, more involvement of the private sector and civil society is imperative. More effective coordination among donors and greater selectivity of aid flows in line with government commitment to reduce poverty will be required. Furthermore, mutual accountability to deliver results will be needed to sustain the credibility of the partnership between donors and beneficiaries of aid. Lastly, at the local level, greater involvement of the poor themselves in the design and operation of development programs is desirable. This will require businesslike alliances between official agencies and the voluntary sector, the vision of the Comprehensive Development Framework.

## Institutional adjustment will need to take place at the global as well as the country level.

Whether it is the lack of policies and programs to protect the poor against the vagaries of nature, or the lack of access to clean water, schooling, health clinics, or credit, the main constraint the poor face is a lack of empowerment and a sense of exclusion from the decisions that affect their lives. In most cases, *participation* is the missing ingredient. A similar predicament exists at the global level, where the voice of the poor is muted.

The basic dilemma of collective action faced by the poor is that they are too weak: too numerous, too dispersed, and too diverse in their interests to form effective coalitions. How to give voice to the voiceless poor; how to give them a seat at the table when development programs are debated and policy priorities are set; and how to channel their scattered energies and extraordinary survival skills into productive pursuits is the fundamental challenge of development assistance.

At the local level, partnerships among the central government, local communities, and voluntary organizations are critically important both to ensure that the voices of the poor are heard and to guarantee that solutions adapted to the local circumstances are designed and implemented. Greater opportunity for the poor to engage in productive activities requires that partnerships with the private sector be forged to provide the poor with employment opportunities. Here again, civil society has a critical role to play in mediating among the business sector, the public sector, and individuals in poor communities.

*Social entrepreneurship* has begun to mobilize local communities. Provision of microcredit has been pioneered by private voluntary organizations. Advisory services or independent verification by nongovernmental organizations are gradually ensuring that multinational companies investing in developing countries behave as good corporate citizens and engage in local consultations so as to show the way to their domestic counterparts, facilitate community development, and ensure full compliance with sound environmental practice.

Lastly, in recognition of the fact that government goods are critical ingredients of effective governance, civic advocacy groups are challenging the workings of the state to ensure that it is responsive to the needs of all citizens, including the poor. Con-

versely, politicians and public servants dedicated to transparency, accountability, and the rule of law deserve privileged external support. Basic capacity-building is a worthy development assistance priority in pursuit of poverty reduction.

## CONCLUSION

There is still time to banish absolute poverty from the face of the earth and to avoid ecological destruction. Fifty years after the development crusade began, much has been learned about the development process. There is now broad-based consensus with respect to the determinants of equitable and sustainable development. The strategies to achieve poverty reduction are well known. With appropriate leadership, a consensus for reform can materialize at local and global levels.

## Poverty-reduction programs make clear distinctions among inputs, outputs, outcomes, and impacts.

Poverty reduction requires extensive production of a wide variety of goods. In turn, these goods need to be produced through a diversity of organizations adapted to the requirements of each type of good. To achieve sustainable results, the overall institutional framework must reflect the needs of the market, the aspirations and knowledge of the people, and the judicious support of the state.

This implies multiple partnerships among the private, public, and voluntary sectors. Culture matters, but the lessons of development experience show that organizational mismatch (e.g., efforts to substitute the state for the market) is a fundamental constraint. Until pragmatic principles of institutional design become part of the belief system, the poverty-reduction crusade will not succeed.

The world has ample resources to get the job done. The specific challenge of poverty reduction lies in the construction of *institutional capacity* in the government, private sector, and civil society of developing countries and transition economies. This must be combined with the forging of purposeful global partnerships focused on critical public-policy gaps and grounded in the comparative advantage of different institutional actors. Underlying the overall challenge is the urgent need to shift beliefs and values from unbridled individualism to environmental realism—and from heedless competition to social cooperation. This cultural shift may be the most critical of all.

### Notes

[1] Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15–18th Century,* vol. 1: *The Structures of Everyday Life,* trans. Sian Reynolds (Fortuna, Calif.: Univ. of California Press, 1985).

[2] Deepak Lal, *Unintended Consequences: The Impact of Factor Endowments, Culture and Politics on Long Run Economic Performance* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998).

[3] United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998).

[4] Robert Reich, "Social Dislocation Is Behind US Rejection of Free Trade," *Business Day,* June 14, 1999.

[5] Jeffrey Sachs, "Helping the World's Poorest," *The Economist,* Aug. 14–20, 1999.

[6] Francis Fukuyama, *The Great Global Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of the Social Order* (New York: Free Press, 1999).

[7] Charles Wolf, Jr., *Markets and Governments: Choosing Between Imperfect Alternatives,* 2d ed. (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1997).

[8] Lester M. Salamon, "The Nonprofit Sector and the Challenge of Renewal: U.S. and Global Perspectives" (paper presented at the annual conference of the Coalition of National Voluntary Organizations, Ottawa, Ont., Canada, Sept. 18, 1999; available online: http://www.nvo-onb.ca/salamon.html).

[9] David Bornstein, "A Force Now in the World, Citizens Flex Social Muscle, " *The New York Times,* July 10, 1999.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Wolfgang H. Reinicke, "Global Public Policy," *Foreign Affairs,* vol. 76, no. 6, Nov./Dec. 1997.

[12] See Nagy Hanna, *1999 Annual Review of Development Effectiveness* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2000).

[13] Dennis Purcell and Jack Andersen, *Agriculture and Research: Achievements and Problems in National Systems* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997).

# A Total Balkan Approach

by George A. Papandreou

In this era of dramatic change for Southeastern Europe, Greece is pursuing a foreign policy aimed at creating greater regional stability, democracy, and development. This policy is based on a simple but profound truth: that the interests and well-being of the people in our region are aligned with the principles and policies of Greece.

Our goal was and is to safeguard our national interests in such a way that we contribute to the solution of regional problems. We have taken advantage of our dual identity as a full member of the democratic institutions of the West and a country bound by geography and history to the Balkans. As the only full member of the European Union (EU) and NATO in the region, we feel a responsibility to represent the interests of our neighbors in these institutions and to help them prepare for integration into the European framework.

## Greece has a dual identity: as a full member of the democratic institutions of the West and as a country bound by geography and history to the Balkans.

As a result, Greece is now seen as a model for other Balkan countries. It is a country that has succeeded in transforming itself, building on the principles of its tradition while assimilating new ideas. Greece has opened up the prospect of a European Balkans. We want to give the Balkans a credible voice. We want to establish a broad consensus regarding the future of our peoples, by initiating a dialogue of equals throughout the Balkan peninsula. Ultimately, we want to realize the vision of the Greek freedom fighter Rigas Phereos: united through common interests and democratic values, the Balkan people can determine their own future.

Greece plays a leading role in the political and economic reconstruction of the Balkans. This role has been officially recognized with the designation of the northern port city of Thessaloniki as headquarters of both the Agency for the Reconstruction of South East Europe and the Balkan Stability Pact. Many countries—including the United States, the Czech Republic, Italy, Russia, Turkey, France, Great Britain, Germany, and Canada—have sought bilateral cooperation with Greece to implement other Balkan initiatives.

Regional leadership creates an advantage but also new responsibilities for our

George A. Papandreou is minister of foreign affairs of the Hellenic Republic. He previously was undersecretary for cultural affairs and minister of education and religious affairs. He is a founding member of the Lagonisi Initiative on Cooperation in the Balkans and was Government Coordinator for the 1996 Olympic Games Hellenic Candidacy.

country. Hellenism is being called upon to define a new vision for the Balkan region—a new vision of peace and democracy for a region that has suffered so much through incessant wars.

Faced with this challenge, Greece has created a comprehensive regional strategy, what I term a Total Balkan Approach: a regional approach to democracy, security, and prosperity. Our objectives are to control potential sources of conflict and to create the prerequisites for political and financial development. Our ultimate goal is regional integration into European institutions. This strategy is founded upon the principles of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, respect of existing borders, and dissuasion of separatist tendencies and divisive ideologies. At the same time, we actively promote the establishment of democratic procedures, as well as the protection of human and minority rights.

## The international community must support a consistent, coherent, and unified approach to Southeastern Europe.

If this Total Balkan Approach is to succeed, the international community must support such a consistent, coherent, and unified approach to Southeastern Europe. We cannot have competing spheres of influence and double standards. Principles and regulations must be applied uniformly. The international community's approach to the Balkans should be based on fostering democracy, security, and development, and integration into the European Union. Development should focus on programs that are beneficial to the entire region and promote regional cooperation. Development should also go hand in hand with the building of democratic institutions and the security of minorities in the region. Regional and international cooperation are essential to building consensus regarding individual citizens' rights to self-determination. The Balkans are peopled by a wealth of minorities. Up to and including the last century, these minorities were always the source—and very often the victims—of violent conflicts.

I believe that if these Greek principles are implemented everywhere from Cyprus to Bosnia, the door to broader regional security will have opened. The implementation of these principles will dramatically transform the role and status of minorities. Once considered a threat and a factor of destabilization, minorities will become a channel of communication and cooperation among peoples and states, enhancing the Balkan identity within a multicultural European environment. Only then can Balkan countries break free from introversion and carry forward their own cultural proposition within the new emerging Europe.

The Balkan Stability Pact and the decisions taken at the EU summit in Helsinki in December 1999 have created a new reality: a framework of principles and a roadmap for the Balkans in their course toward European integration. This is why Greece strenuously supported a meaningful candidacy for Turkey and the strengthening of relations among Bulgaria, Romania (two candidate countries), the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Albania, and the EU. This new framework should

embrace Serbia as well. As Serbia moves on to democratic reform, it should be an active part of this process. Excluding Serbia would be inconsistent with our principles of inclusiveness. Greece strongly advocates a comprehensive, consistent policy to be carried out within a specific time frame.

During the crisis in Kosovo, Greece undertook a series of diplomatic and humanitarian initiatives to restore peace and stability to the region. It was the first country to draw up a comprehensive reconstruction plan for the Balkans. From 2000 to 2005, Greece has pledged a total of GRD100 billion (approximately $298 million) for the reconstruction of Kosovo, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and FYROM.

The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs spends GRD4 billion ($12 million) every year on developmental aid to other countries. Balkan countries are our first priority, followed by the Middle East, the Black Sea region, and the Caucasus. In 1999, 50% of the GRD464.5 million ($1.4 million) given to Southeastern European countries was used to help refugees from Kosovo. In 1999, in association with the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the first Greek International Developmental Cooperation Agency to support the work of Greek nongovernmental organizations.

This new approach to foreign policy calls for new and innovative forms of diplomacy, such as "citizen's diplomacy." The nongovernmental sector is an essential factor in the Total Balkan Approach, as it creates networks of interaction and cultivates mutual understanding and trust. Strengthening civil society allows our citizens to participate equally in shaping foreign policy. Only common interests can establish a common vision for long-term cooperation among all countries of the region. Citizen's diplomacy is a new, dynamic tool through which people can shape the future of their region.

## Citizen's diplomacy is a new, dynamic tool through which people can shape the future of their region.

The 2004 Olympic Games in Athens will provide a unique opportunity for cultivating citizen's diplomacy. In a gesture towards our cultural and democratic heritage, Greece has revived an ancient ideal: the Olympic truce. Our dream is to bring about a global ceasefire, to coincide with the 2004 Athens Olympics. The institution of the Olympic truce represents one more contribution of Hellenism to promoting world peace.

# Lessons from Failure:
# The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict

by Jorge O. Laucirica

The dispute between Argentina and Great Britain over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands[1] led to the only major war between two Western countries since World War II. It is an interesting case for the study of preventive diplomacy and conflict management, as it involves a cross-section of international relations. The conflict involved (a) a major power, Great Britain; (b) an active U.S. role, first as a mediator and then as an ally to one of the parties; (c) a subcontinental power, albeit a "minor" player in a broader context, Argentina; (d) a global intergovernmental organization, the United Nations; and (e) a regional intergovernmental organization, the Organization of American States (OAS).

The Falklands/Malvinas territory encompasses two large islands, East and West Falkland—or Soledad and Gran Malvina, according to the Argentine denomination—as well as some 200 smaller islands, all of them scattered in a 7,500-mile area situated about 500 miles northeast of Cape Horn and 300 miles east of the Argentine coastline. The population of the Falklands is 2,221, according to the territorial census of 1996.[2]

Argentina formally brought the dispute over sovereignty to the attention of the UN, in the context of decolonization, in 1965. A process including resolutions, grievances, and bilateral negotiations carried on for seventeen years, culminating in the 1982 South Atlantic war. Eighteen years after the confrontation, and despite the latest changes in the status quo (commercial flights between the islands and Argentina were reestablished in 1999), the conflict remains open, with Argentina still clinging to its claims of sovereignty over Malvinas and the South Georgia, South Orcadas, South Shetland, and South Sandwich Islands, all of them located in the South Atlantic and administered by the United Kingdom.

What are the lessons we can draw from the Malvinas case in an effort to move toward a more systematic approach to conflict prevention by the international community? This paper addresses the case of the 1982 Falklands war as a critical example of failure by the international system and its many components to avert conflict. To understand how this came to be, I will expose the major variables and pitfalls that led to distorsions, misconceptions, underestimation, prejudice, and finally war. Based on the cross-analysis of secondary sources, I will then propose the basic outlines for a new multilateral approach to international conflict.

---

**Jorge O. Laucirica** is an Argentine journalist and a Fulbright scholar. He received his master's degree from the School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, in May 2000.

## "A Bleak and Gloomy Solitude"

It is uncertain who first saw the islands. They were so distant, so insignificant, so barren, their surrounding sea so perilous, that for many years they remained unclaimed. The Spanish, British, French, and Portuguese all sailed past this inhospitable landscape, bearing little if any hint of how explosive an issue it would become.

One thing seems clear: this forlorn archipelago was the last of the great discoveries in the West to be settled by Europeans. In January 1684, Ambrose Conley and William Dampier were the first British to spot them through the South Atlantic mist. They named them *Pepy's Islands*, in honor of the secretary of the Admiralty.[3] On January 27, 1690, Captain John Strong made the first landing of Englishmen on the isles and called them the *Falklands*, probably after Anthony, Viscount of Falkland (1659–1694), who was at the time a commissioner of Admiralty and later first Lord.[4]

The first colonization of the islands was planned during the heart of the Seven Years' War between France and England. The French sent an expedition led by Antoine Louis de Bougainville, who claimed possession of the islands on April 5, 1764, in the name of Louis XV. He called them *Les Malouines* after his French hometown, Saint Malo. The Spanish, long settled on the mainland by this time, asserted their legal rights to the archipelago based on the theory of territorial proximity. A transfer was arranged and the cession completed on February 8, 1767, in Buenos Aires. A new denomination, *Islas Malvinas,* was derived from the former French name.[5]

Over the course of the eighteenth century, the islands came to be regarded by the three great colonial powers as a key access point to the southern straits and Cape Horn. That explains the British settlement of January 1765 on West Falkland and a second expedition that arrived on January 8, 1766, two years after the French had landed and fourteen months before the Spanish took possession.

On June 10, 1770, a Spanish expedition removed the British settlement in Port Egmont by force, which brought the major European powers to the brink of armed conflict. War was averted by a declaration issued on January 22, 1771, restoring the status quo ante. According to a number of authors, there were no reservations of rights by the British, who promised—but did not affirm by signature—to later evacuate the Western island, thus acknowledging Spanish predominance in the area.[6] The British abandoned the settlement on May 20, 1774, leaving behind a lead plate fastened to the blockhouse stating that the area was the property of the Crown.[7]

Surely none of the great powers involved in this first collision imagined that more than two hundred years later, one of them would finally go into battle for what Samuel Johnson then described as "a bleak and gloomy solitude, an island thrown aside from human use."[8]

## The Setting for a Modern Tragedy

A whole different scenario existed in the 1980s. First, Spain was no longer a stakeholder in the Americas, although the Falklands case bears a certain resemblance to its claim over Gibraltar. In 1810, a revolutionary movement overthrew the last

Spanish viceroy in Buenos Aires, and in 1816 the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata (later Argentina) declared independence. In November 1820, Daniel Jewitt, an Englishman, took possession of Malvinas for the United Provinces, on the legal ground of the colonial heritage. In 1833, British captain J. J. Onslow, whose instructions "carried the full weight of the British government and the knowledge and support of the king,"[9] took over the islands, displacing an Argentine garrison without fighting. The United Kingdom remained in possession of the territory until April 1982.

Secondly, Argentina, Britain's rival, was not a major international power, and was certainly not expected to challenge one of the leaders of the Western hemisphere and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Thirdly, the articulation of ancient colonial empires, such as those of France, Britain, Spain, and Portugal, was finished, especially after the wave of decolonization during the 1960s that followed UN Resolution 1514 (XV).

Instead, the cold war rivalry of the Soviet Union and the United States was the stage on which all of international affairs was set. In the Americas, this translated into the existence of U.S.-backed Latin American dictatorships, including the one ruling in Argentina at the time of the war with Britain. Another substantial new element consisted of the regional alliances formed in the post–World War II period, such as NATO, the OAS, and the Warsaw Pact, all driven by national and regional security concerns.

Lastly, but certainly neither in chronology nor in importance, the international scenario of the 1980s included the United Nations, which was created with the primary goal of maintaining collective peace and security.[10] Toward that end, UN bodies—and particularly the Security Council—are empowered by means of the UN Charter to pursue the peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter VI), as well as the prevention and removal of threats to the peace or acts of aggression (Chapter VII).[11]

Nothing like this existed in 1770, when war was averted over the Falklands. There were multilateral regimes, like the Treaty of Utrecht, but no permanent structures designed to prevent any breach in international peace and coexistence. This is what makes the 1982 failure even more astonishing: history repeated itself as tragedy, in spite of past lessons and new instruments designed to prevent conflict.

## The War That Should Never Have Been

After more than 130 years of frustration at a bilateral level, Argentina submitted the Malvinas case in 1965 to the UN's "Committee of 24" on decolonization, starting what Hastings and Jenkins call the "Seventeen Years' war."[12]

In 1946, upon the founding of the UN, Great Britain had included the Falkland Islands among the nonautonomous territories subject to its administration, under Chapter XI of the UN charter. From then on, it regularly submitted annual reports on the social, economic, and educational conditions of the islands, according to Chapter XI, Article 73e of the charter.[13]

On December 16, 1965, Resolution 2065 (XX) recognized "the existence of a

dispute between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom concerning sovereignty over the (Falkland) islands." The General Assembly invited both countries

> to proceed without delay with the negotiations recommended by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem, bearing in mind the provisions and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).[14]

The UN thus returned to the field of bilateral diplomacy a highly complicated issue, loaded with nonnegotiable elements and compounded by the existence of an almost third-party islander population, who claimed self-determination as the underpinning of their right to choose to be part of the United Kingdom.

A series of diplomatic meetings ensued between 1966 and 1968, in the context of an excellent working relationship characterized by mutual understanding, good communication, and reliability,[15] between Argentine and English diplomats. Basic agreements were reached at this technical level, where the ripeness for a framework settlement was being developed.

## History repeated itself as tragedy, in spite of past lessons and new instruments designed to prevent conflict.

But with the international community's having left the two parties to themselves, there was no one to exert a timely and adequate leverage on the decision makers. Soon, these preliminary achievements were undermined, first by a group of young Argentine Peronists who hijacked a plane and landed on Malvinas, and then by the islanders' lobby in London, which found sympathy in the British press and parliament. The combination of Port Stanley residents' fears and British parliamentary opposition brought the dialogue to a virtual stalemate, which was not properly addressed by the United Nations and did not sound any alarms within the cold war–occupied Security Council.

The 1970s witnessed a reduced level of negotiation, with sovereignty dropped from the agenda, thus skirting the heart of the matter. British undersecretary David Scott suggested a functionalist approach, which basically "concentrated on establishing confidence in areas where minor accord seemed feasible."[16] The highlight of that framework was the 1971 Communication Agreement with Buenos Aires, according to which the British would build an airstrip and the Argentinians would run air service.[17]

On December 14, 1973, the General Assembly issued Resolution 3160, recalling its previous documents on the subject and "gravely concerned at the fact that eight years [has] elapsed since the adoption of Resolution 2065, without any substantial progress having been made in the negotiations."[18] The assembly also declared in the

same resolution "the need to accelerate the negotiations" and urged both governments "to proceed without delay" and "to report as soon as possible, and no later than at its twenty-ninth session, on the results of the recommended negotiations."[19]

Thus the UN was barely engaged in a decaying process, in terms of direct involvement in the negotiations, close and alert monitoring of the ripening framework, adequate leverage, or timely political pressure to bring about a breakthrough. By January 1976, British fears of political costs and a Peronist-nationalist revival in Argentina had gradually weakened the process and added up to a new deadlock. The British parliament banned any dealings on sovereignty issues. Incidents arising from an increasingly militarized Argentine state spurred resentment among the islanders and British legislators. The Falklands lobby was also fueled by a report, "Economic Survey of the Falkland Islands," prepared by Lord Shackleton and issued by the British government in 1976, forecasting a promising future for the islands.[20] As Hastings and Jenkins observe, however, Shackleton "was made to imply this wealth was dependent on Britain being 'willing to have economic cooperation with Argentina.'"[21]

Things began moving again on a technical level, with the Foreign Office—already in the Thatcher era—and Argentine diplomats committed to the development of "an economic package which could be sold to the islanders in return for some understanding on sovereignty and administration."[22] But they were alone, technically engaged in a problem that required political compromise at a high level and decisive input by a reliable third party to hone in on possible breakthroughs and lay the foundations for a settlement of the dispute.

Nobody was there at the ripe moment. There were no third parties to provide close monitoring, nor pressing or encouraging intervention—on the British parliament, Buenos Aires, or the islanders—with the right timing. The "lease-back" alternative, on the table around 1980, foundered in the hostile waters of the House of Commons and the Falklands lobby. Clearly, it was a time for readdressing priorities and focusing on a settlement between the major players. Instead, highlighting self-determination at the wrong time narrowed the potential for a much more productive outcome.

April 1982 found the president of the Security Council, Kamanda wa Kamanda of Zaire, calling for restraint, and the president of the United States making a desperate last-minute effort to stop the Argentine takeover. By that time, it was much too late. The real opportunities had been there for at least seventeen years, long before the war broke out.

From this overview, it is clear that a faltering international structure laid the foundation for violence in Malvinas. Many opportunities to encourage a settlement were lost for a lack of awareness, commitment, and credible enforcement ability of the international community. Therein lies the comprehensive explanation: human actions and decisions, evaluated in terms of opportunities, mounted on long-held grievances deeply imbedded in the national imagery, set in motion state policies against the background of a permissive international structure.

## The Role of Perceptions

It is revealing to analyze the Malvinas episode of 1982 counterfactually, in terms of what it was not.

(a) *It was not a war of imperialism or colonialism,* even though Argentina claimed it was fighting against the remains of a colonial empire. One could assert that colonialism was, indeed, the origin of the whole situation, back in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but this situation no longer held in 1982, particularly because the islanders unanimously wished to remain part of Great Britain.

(b) *It was not an offspring of the cold war*. Quite to the contrary, the situation's neglect by the international community could be traced to its falling outside the lines of this conflict. Furthermore, the Argentine government was held up by the United States as an example of a friendly anticommunist regime. This was probably a highly disorienting factor: neither the Americans nor the world were yet prepared to face an intrasystem war in the Western world.

(c) *It was not a religious or ethnic conflict.* The islanders are of English and Scottish descent, speak English as a native language, and have a culture of their own, greatly influenced by their ancestry. But there has never been any claim from Buenos Aires for the population of Malvinas to abandon their lifestyle, which was granted constitutional status in Argentina in 1994. Nor has there been any religious clash: the islanders are Christian, and many non-Catholic religious groups peacefully coexist with the Catholic majority on the mainland. The same has always been the case between the Anglican majority and the Catholic parishioners in the islands.

(d) *There was no ancient hatred between the two states*. Aside from two confrontations in the first half of the nineteenth century, feelings of antipathy against Great Britain only arose in Argentina with regard to Malvinas; the Argentine political establishment and the national economy were strongly U.K.-oriented until the late 1930s.

What was it, then, that set off the belligerency? In the first place, there existed a long-held grievance, deeply rooted in the Argentine culture. Argentines are raised and systematically educated in the belief that "las Malvinas fueron, son y serán Argentinas" ("the Malvinas were, are and will be Argentine"), a pervasive national slogan that appears in textbooks, on buildings and road signs, in schools, and in public ceremonies throughout the country. Subject to manipulation, this can be a very powerful engine behind national mobilization. In a country of immigrants, without a significant ethnic core shaping a national conscience, national symbols become the very glue of patriotism. The Malvinas play a major role in this regard, to the point of being part of Argentina's national identity. Shaw and Wang underline the link between patriotism and international conflict when they assert that leaders "learn to appeal to things sacred, to the cognitive and emotive processes in the identification mechanism."[23]

But it would be a mistake to restrict the interpretation of the 1982 conflict to popular sentiment. Patriotism—like ethnicity or religion in a different context—tends to be both the catalyst for, and the instrument of, political maneuver. The perceptions of the leadership, therefore, are fundamental. On the Argentine side of the equation,

a realistic—though misguided—approach by the military rulers weighed the permissiveness of the international environment and the potential reaction of the United States, which they deemed either tepid or neutral. It is clear that in 1982, all the conditions for escalation obtained: before April 2, the Argentine decision makers considered that there were no conflict-limiting norms and institutions, no organizations concerned with their grievances, and no effective mediation services, and that, in general terms, there was no "justice" available for Argentina. Therefore, they decided to take matters into their own hands.

This is precisely one of the key indicators of the failure of the international community to forestall violence: despite seventeen years of warning signs, no one seemed to realize the explosive potential of the mounting conflict. In his emphasis on the importance of early warning in preventive diplomacy, Evans acknowledges a shameful level of unpreparedness in the Falklands case: "The intense focus on early warning stems from the Falklands conflict, which took the UN by such surprise that it is said that there were no maps of the islands to be found in the UN secretariat when the invasion occurred."[24]

## Despite seventeen years of warning signs, no one seemed to realize the explosive potential of the mounting conflict.

On the British side, the Thatcher government needed political oxygen to carry on its unpopular economic reforms, and Great Britain needed to flex its military might to recover part of its waning claim to being a world power. Internal politics in Britain played a major role, as it had in previous ripe moments. Well-crafted attempts to alter the status quo, which had been patiently achieved by diplomats on at least two occasions during the 1960s and the 1970s, went down in flames in the British parliament because of lobbying and public opinion. This seems to justify Kittani's assertion that "preventive diplomacy and peacemaking tend to be most effective when least well known."[25]

### MEDIATION UNDER FIRE

There were three major belated mediations between the Argentine military government headed by General Leopoldo Galtieri and the British Government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher on or after April 2, 1982: (1) U.S. president Ronald Reagan's last-minute attempt before the Argentine takeover (usually not included in the assessment of mediations) and U.S. secretary of state Alexander Haig's "shuttle" attempts; (2) Peruvian president Fernando Belaunde Terry's efforts "in a tandem interlocutor role with Haig";[26] and (3) U.N. secretary-general Javier Pérez de Cuellar's exercise of good offices at UN headquarters in New York. It is outside the scope of this article to describe each case in detail, but it is useful to examine them to the extent that they reveal an inextricable web of misconceptions, vested interests, and willful but unproductive last-minute diplomacy, exactly in the opposite direction of the preventive model we suggest.

At a late stage of any conflict, mediation is severely constrained. Negotiations hardly ever can be kept secret; assessment of power is deeply biased; political costs rise steeply; and variables beyond manipulation, such as nationalism, pride, and honor, taint any rational attempt to fold the problem back to its fundamentals. Overall, the perceptual process is severely filtered by defensive behavior. There is little room for any strategy other than the urgent need to cease fire, which is most frequently the least any of the belligerents will want to do.

## Nationalism, pride, and honor taint any rational attempt to fold a problem back to its fundamentals.

This is where conceptual distinctions become more relevant to our issue. Last-minute mediations and shuttle diplomacy when hostilities have broken out are clearly not preventive diplomacy. As Lund sharply distinguishes, "preventive diplomacy would typically begin to come into play when tensions in the relationship between parties are in danger of shifting from stable peace or worse."[27] Even more appropriate for our purposes, he states that preventive diplomacy "operates between peacetime and crisis diplomacy."[28] As mentioned, two derailed negotiation processes in the 1960s and the 1970s clearly marked an opportunity for preventive intervention.

As late as February 27 and 28, 1982, a new round of talks held in New York failed to produce any improvements in the situation.[29] On March 1, the military junta ruling in Buenos Aires issued an implicitly threatening communiqué, with a final paragraph stating that Argentina "upholds the right to put an end to the work of that mechanism [the bilateral negotiation] and to freely choose the procedure that best suits its interests."[30] On March 3, Richard Luce, the British undersecretary and negotiator, faced the parliament and publicly assured its members that preventive measures should be adopted "to protect the islands against an unexpected attack."[31]

The British press interpreted the episode variously as a threat of military action *(The Guardian),* mounting pressure *(The Times),* or at least a warning *(The Financial Times).* Cardoso et al. stress the importance of this turning point by noting that

> thus worded, the communiqué played the tune of a favorite march in the sensitive ears of the military; to the international public opinion—heedless to this austral growl—it ought to have signaled the beginning of a countdown.[32]

Around the same time, in March 1982, there was another diplomatic incident between the two parties. In this case, the dismantling of a whaling factory in the Georgias islands—which lie within the Argentine claims—was carried out by an Argentine entrepreneur according to a contract signed in 1979, which sparked a British reaction. Again, an incident that should have sent up a red flag to the international community and provoked its engagement did not.

Precisely for these reasons, the failure of the international system in the Falklands case is all the more astonishing and complete. Any rigorous evaluation has to rewind to 1965 instead of looking at the period of April–May 1982. By so doing, we can gather enough evidence to show that previous inaction and wrongdoing hampered

any initiative even at the late stages before the war. In other words, there is a good basis to contend that the lack of adequate preventive efforts implies a greater probability of failure at the levels of crisis diplomacy and peacemaking.

### THE DISTORTING ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

The U.S. involvement in the Falklands crisis reveals the negative impact of any mediation driven by national interest, and the disturbing role of a major superpower with multiple and contradictory alliance commitments in the international arena.

On the one hand, it is undisputed that the U.S. mediation in the British-Argentine conflict had only a thin veneer of neutrality: the United States favored the British. On the other hand, the American government had been courting and cajoling the Argentinian military regime, whose illegitimate power—obtained by the systematic use of violence and repression since 1976—was not questioned *ab initio* but given international status as a "privileged partner" to support U.S.-oriented contra-insurgence in Central America.

The footprints of this winding and misleading policy are everywhere. Hastings and Jenkins describe the situation:

> Argentina in 1981 was enjoying a novel and exhilarating experience. She was being courted openly by the most powerful nation on earth. The previous years had seen American visitors whose concern, for once, was not prisons and torture chambers, and who asked no questions on human rights. . . . They discussed ending the Carter arms embargo and greeted the Argentinians as fellow fighters against Marxism in Latin America. They held out the vision of a new anti-Communist alliance in the South Atlantic.[33]

Tunnicliff points out that Argentina's General Galtieri visited the United States on two occasions in 1981 and was well received.[34] Furthermore, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick gave the U.S. embrace of Argentina theoretical underpinning with her distinctions between "authoritarian" regimes like the Argentinian—which deserved credit, regardless of human rights violations—and "totalitarian" regimes like that of Cuba, "to be opposed as threats to the national security interests of the United States."[35]

---

## The lack of adequate preventive efforts implies a greater probability of failure at the levels of crisis diplomacy and peacemaking.

---

During one of his visits to the United States, Galtieri addressed his hosts with typical military grandeur: "Argentina and the United States will march alongside in the ideological war currently taking place in the world."[36] Enthralled by such a public commitment, Richard Allen, one of Reagan's national security advisors, returned the favor by praising the general's "majestic personality."[37] The misleading effect of this wooing cannot be overestimated. One year after the landing on the Falklands, Galtieri

told the Buenos Aires newspaper *Clarín:* "If I had known the Americans would take the position they finally adopted, we would never have invaded."[38]

But it was not only the indirect boosting of a dangerous adventure (by ignoring the explosive potential of the Falklands issue) that made Washington partially culpable for the 1982 crisis. It was primarily its multiple alliance commitment and its vested and overlapping interests that curbed mediation efforts. On the one hand, there was the U.S. commitment to Great Britain through NATO, and the British demand of loyalty and intervention by its NATO partners. As Baker points out:

> All the U.S. activities in the crisis support this observation; her reliance on UN's Security Council Resolution 502; her consultations with the British; her granting of aid both military and logistical; all suggest that the United States did recognize her commitments to Britain, and indeed she met those obligations.[39]

On the other hand, the United States was bound to Argentina through the charter of the OAS and the terms of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact), drawn up in 1947. The OAS response to the circumstances was not precisely swift. There was no emergency session, and a first meeting was held only on April 26, upon the Argentine request to consider the British counterattack as an aggression on American territory.

Baker summarizes the process in the OAS.[40] The first resolution on the conflict issued by the organization, on April 28, recognized Argentine sovereignty over the Falklands and deplored the sanctions adopted by the European Economic Community and other states against Argentina.[41] The United States opposed even the meeting, because it did not want to be placed in a position of having to adhere to the terms of the Rio Pact against Britain. It along with Chile, Colombia, and Trinidad and Tobago abstained from voting on the resolution.

On April 30, the United States stepped out of the mediation process and imposed military and economic sanctions on Argentina. Its support of the British side extended to technical and logistical assistance. On May 28, a second OAS resolution condemned not only the United Kingdom but also the United States for supporting the European power. It was too little, too late. The organization proved powerless without the commitment of the United States to back its decisions. As Bennett states, the OAS adopted "mild resolutions of support for Argentina, but the organization could play no constructive role in settling the dispute."[42] The author cites Ellen Frey-Wouters to unveil the subordinate role of the alliance:

> The primary role of the Latin American members of the OAS in most collective security cases has been to provide a multilateral legitimacy for unilateral U.S. action. The OAS serves to carry out the extra-continental objectives of the U.S., free from any control by the UN. It can be expected that the OAS will continue, at least in the immediate future, to be misused as a means to intervene against regimes of states which do not meet with approval of the U.S.[43]

Baker concludes that the Falklands war

> was not a case of Communist aggression and as such did not represent the

superpower battle for world influence. For the United States, it was a case of
NATO commitments versus OAS commitments; more importantly, the NATO
member involved in the war was a major player in the alliance and reputed to
be the closest ally to the United States. Although Argentina and the OAS are
both important to the US, they are far less important than Britain and NATO.[44]

Legally, then, the United States was neutral in the question of sovereignty over
the Falkland Islands; but politically and militarily, they had a clear priority in this war.
Haig left no doubt about it on May 27, before the OAS: "Great Britain is a vital
partner in the alliance with Europe which is the first line of defense for Western
civilization against the dangers of Soviet aggression."[45]

By the same token, it can be said that, far from being a real threat to the inter-
American system, Britain appeared to the eyes of the United States as a reliable ad-
ministrator of the Falklands, just as it had been for 150 years, and officially for the
UN since 1946. This was not new; in fact, it bore a long tradition. When the British
seized the islands, in 1833, the United States did not invoke the Monroe Doctrine.
According to Goebel, "it was convenient that the Falklands should be regarded as a
pre-Revolutionary possession of Great Britain to which the doctrine naturally had no
application."[46] Exactly the same occurred with the signing of the Rio Pact in 1947.
The United States claimed that the Falklands did not fall under the provisions of the
OAS, since they had been submitted to the UN as a colonial administration of the
Crown in 1946.

The implications of this interaction are plain to see: regional alliances are not
always the most suitable instrument for multilateral intervention in the context of
protracted international conflicts, insofar as their main purpose is not necessarily po-
litical neutrality but national security.

## The UN during the War

Although the disagreement between Britain and Argentina was already 130 years
old by the time it was formally brought to the attention of the international commu-
nity in 1965, and the armed conflict should therefore be considered the outcome of a
longer process, the UN intervention in April/May 1982 gives some relevant hints to
assess the performance of the organization and its handling of the conflict.

Security Council Resolution 502, on April 3, 1982, was the immediate reaction
to the Argentine takeover, and surely a major accomplishment of the British Foreign
Office, which set the favorable conditions upon which the United Kingdom would
develop its actions during the conflict. The resolution essentially demanded an im-
mediate Argentine withdrawal from the islands and called upon both governments to
seek "a diplomatic solution to their differences and to respect fully the purposes and
principles of the charter of the UN."[47] This reference to the charter was not a formal
detail: It gave Britain the rights of (a) citing the principle of *self-determination* for the
Falklanders in any negotiation and (b) relying on the principle of individual and
collective *self-defense* if armed attack occurred. Resolution 502 has to be broadly as-
sessed more as the result of seventeen years of fumbling UN intervention than the

inevitable first answer to an armed attack. Seen in that light, it can also be considered as another step back in the way of any viable outcome, since it raised the principle of "self-determination" as a prerequisite, whereas the UN policy on the matter from 1965 had been guided by the "interests" of the islands' population—interpreted as security, traditional lifestyle, civil rights, and other matters on the part of Argentina, and as "wishes" by the British,[48] but leaving room for a technical and political understanding. Any hope for progress since Resolution 2065 had certainly been through this open door. Now, the UN had closed it and added a full-fledged third party to the process.

The next steps also show the UN's lack of political initiative at the time. As Tunnicliff demonstrates in a comparative study of UN mediations, "the United Nations mediation effort in the war for the Falklands/Malvinas began only after the attempt of the US Secretary of State Haig had failed."[49] The author considers that among the facilitative conditions for a successful UN mediation is the need for the UN to intervene "prior to efforts by any other third parties,"[50] which he explains as follows:

> The importance of timing in an intervention effort is obvious. If an offer to mediate comes in the wake of a failed effort by another third party, the chances of success are likely to be thought by all parties diminished. . . . Implicit in this condition is the belief that an intervenor [sic] cannot hope to function successfully without the ability to take at least some initiatives quickly, authoritatively, and with a sure hand.[51]

But this is not the only effect of the late UN intervention. As we have already seen, the United States was only a stakeholder in disguise. By letting the Americans step in as supposedly neutral to the collision, and at the same time bringing the principle of self-determination to the fore, the UN was but transforming a two-party process into a four-party conflict, and hence seriously diminishing the chances to resolve it.

## The UN transformed a two-party process into a four-party conflict.

It should also be noted that the Security Council did not make explicit the need for any mediation role by the UN, nor was such a role contemplated in Resolution 502. This was a political decision—and another British triumph—that undermined any further attempt at a peaceful solution, insofar as it is clearly disadvantageous to intervene at such an advanced stage of any international conflict without full empowerment by the organ with "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security."[52]

Tunnicliff points out that "the absence of support from the Security Council is not surprising given the status of the UK as a permanent member of that body. This fact was highlighted by the British veto of a Security Council cease-fire resolution on June 3, 1982."[53] Now the veto was possible: action was taking place under Chapter

VII of the UN Charter. It was also desirable, for the British were about to win the war. Furthermore, as Tunnicliff observes:

> The United States did not support the mediation effort of the Secretary General. During Pérez de Cuellar's negotiations in New York, Secretary Haig was actively engaged in efforts to resuscitate his own proposals. While this was probably done more to promote Haig and his own plan than to handicap the Secretary General, it could not be construed as supportive and did very possibly damage the New York talks. At the very least, the United States maneuvers were discourteous.[54]

In that context, Peruvian president Belaúnde Terry's initiative has also been considered by some authors as too closely resembling Haig's second plan, and entirely subject to Washington's timing and approval. Hastings and Jenkins are very eloquent in that respect:

> What had happened, that extraordinary first week in May, was that Haig had far from given up the ghost. Aware that any overt American role would now be counterproductive, he decided on a covert one. He donated his latest plan to Belaúnde lock, stock and barrel. . . . Belaúnde now sent his "7-point plan" to Buenos Aires. It was an ill-disguised version of Haig Two—Haig in "poncho"— with no extra ingredient beyond the offer of Latin American participation in the interim administration. De Cuellar in New York was embarrassed and annoyed. From now until the San Carlos landing three weeks later, each move in the Falklands peace negotiation was bedeviled by the conflicting ambitions of the various peacemakers.[55]

The abandonment of formal neutrality by the United States had yet another negative implication. As Tunnicliff points out, America's siding with Great Britain "certainly did not encourage British cooperation with the Secretary General and very likely inhibited it."[56] And it is also likely that "once the United States allied itself with the United Kingdom, Washington's attitude toward the United Nations mediation became in part a function of London's attitude."[57]

Kittani calls attention to the fact that "the secretary-general's authority is not entirely dependent on specific mandates from the Security Council or General Assembly,"[58] which is formally true. But then again, as we have seen, his powers and those of the UN as a whole can be sharply curtailed when it comes to dealing with a permanent member of the Security Council.

The implications for proactive and efficient preventive diplomacy loom large: How credible can a system be with such a fundamental restriction? How much effective prevention can it deliver if it does not attempt to tackle issues before the Security Council dynamics come to play? Can the UN, with its current rules and structures, be the only guarantor of a fair, credible, and authoritative system of preventive diplomacy in the world?

Overall, the Falkland process starting in 1965 shows a lack of preventive diplomacy, tardy and failed crisis management, and two wasted periods of stalemate, when there was no multilateral engagement, and the conflict was turned adrift in the inadequate waters of peacetime diplomacy and internal politics.

## LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

What lessons can be drawn from the Falklands/Malvinas case, toward a more effective framework for conflict prevention and resolution?

1.   Superpower involvement does not guarantee the required neutrality, as it is mainly—if not solely—driven *by national interest,* either explicitly or implicitly. While it is true that the same would apply to any state mediation, such a distorting factor is greatly magnified by the pervasive geopolitical interests of a major power.

2.   Regional alliances work as an extension of national security and on the assumption of economic and political empowerment of their individual members. Their effectiveness is further limited when they are subordinated to superpower influence and national interest.

3.   Multiple and overlapping alliance commitments by a major player like the United States cannot be conducive to conflict management and prevention in the best interest of all the parties involved.

4.   As a corollary of points one through three, international organizations—including regional alliances and regimes—have to design new tools to handle international conflict, taking national, regional, and superpower influence into consideration but moving above and beyond their self-interests. In a global world, nothing short of a global answer will suffice.

Only a vast overarching structure—including the UN, but not limited to it—can carry out a more proactive, credible, and forcible process of preventive multilateral diplomacy. It is a provisional working proposition that such a framework would be better undertaken by a relatively autonomous body or forum of professional diplomats and respected international leaders, empowered to monitor negotiations, keep them on track, counterbalance external forces, readdress priorities, and intervene in a much more proactive way. Such a body could be coordinated at the level of the UN secretary-general and should also be closely supported by the Security Council in order to be invested, at least symbolically, with the strength of effective action.

## Multiple and overlapping alliance commitments by a major player cannot be conducive to conflict management and prevention.

An operative device along these lines would count on the logistical support of the UN Secretariat and the Department of Political Affairs—which is currently in charge of gathering information and preparing recommendations for the secretary-general—but it would have to be empowered beyond the bureaucratic constraints of the UN. It is not the lack of information that hinders the international community in the process of conflict prevention, but rather the lack of political will and initiative to mobilize resources and take a stance early on in the development of disputes. The body should be invested with enough autonomy to decide on preventive interventions, as

well as to coordinate vertical and horizontal input in the process at the local, regional, and global levels. The challenge would then be not only recognizing the ripe moment to intervene but also having the will and the mandate to seize the opportunity.

The parties to disputes should be encouraged to submit their differences and engage in primary, evaluative assessments, intended to reach progressive settlements on the road to a long-term agreement. Such a context would diminish the political cost for the states involved. A very important condition would be to have other internal political forces in the conflicting states participate so as to sustain the feasibility of any arrangement in the long run.

Moreover, all mediation with regard to a conflict should be coordinated with this central body. Many experts have concluded that a single guiding formula enables negotiations to keep on track and make progress on a series of accepted principles.[59] At the same time, this technical device prevents any of the parties involved from jumping on and off, back and forth, on a double-track basis, according to their convenience.

## Success for the international system would have meant that the Argentine troops never landed in the Falklands and the British task force never set sail for the South Atlantic.

If the first instance of this preventive framework does not produce results that are sufficiently acceptable to the parties to the dispute, progressive levels of involvement should be readily available. A multilayered, hierarchical structure, softening the rough edges and clearly empowered to be proactive, would be of much more use than leaning back and waiting for the conflict either to be solved by the parties involved or to wane on its own. More often, it will rather wax to the point of no return.

### TEN MINUTES

A final word of caution. In the context or our analysis, war occurs not only because of the parties directly involved but also because of a failure on the part of potential interlocutors to assist and press the parties to search for and address the deep roots of their divergence. International organizations will be judged effective only if they can prevent full-scale conflict on a regular basis and a vast scale. In the long run, they will not succeed by limiting their actions to last-minute attempts at a cease-fire.

Javier Pérez de Cuellar grimly said after the collapse of his peace initiative, in May 1982: "It was the sort of problem which would take ten minutes to solve if both sides were willing."[60] His statement is key to understanding the whole process and what ails it: ten minutes, but not under fire; if both sides are willing, but not left on their own. In the case of the Falklands/Malvinas dispute, there were seventeen years during which the two sides sometimes were willing. But the international community, and particularly the UN, did little more than refer them back to their stalemate, long awaiting a final report that was never to come.

Peace and collective security stand very little chance in the pressure cooker of extreme circumstances. Success for the international system would have meant that the Argentine troops never landed in the Falklands and the British task force never set sail for the South Atlantic.

As Lund states, "Diplomatic, economic, and military policy tools, if deployed early, might head off disastrous outcomes. . . . Preventive diplomacy presents a proactive yet prudent middle course between an unrealistically overreaching interventionism and a blanket isolationism."[61] Peace and collective security will have to be achieved as part of a comprehensive, ongoing process, measuring success and failure not when war has broken out, and therefore against all odds, but in a broader, more powerful, imaginative, reliable, and provocative way.

## Notes

[1] Both names will be used interchangeably throughout this paper.

[2] This was reported in a working paper prepared by the UN Secretariat and issued by the General Assembly on June 1, 1998. See UN General Assembly, Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), working paper prepared by the Secretariat, June 1, 1998, A/AC.10912105.

[3] J. Goebel, *The Struggle for the Falkland Islands: A Study in Legal and Diplomatic History* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1927), p. 240.

[4] Ibid., pp. 241–242.

[5] Ibid.

[6] See, for example, Ibid.; B. Gough, *The Falkland Islands/Malvinas: The Contest for Empire in the South Atlantic* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Athlone Press, 1992), p. 24; and F. Hoffmann and O. Hoffmann, *Sovereignty in Dispute: The Falklands/Malvinas, 1493–1982* (London: Westview Press, 1984), p. 59.

[7] Goebel, *Struggle for the Falkland Islands,* p. 410; and Hoffmann and Hoffmann, *Sovereignty in Dispute,* p. 60.

[8] P. Calvert, *The Falklands Crisis: The Rights and the Wrongs* (London: Francis Pinter, 1982), p. 144.

[9] Gough, *The Falkland Islands/Malvi*nas, p. 94.

[10] For example, see Hoffmann and Hoffmann, *Sovereignty in Dispute,* p. 78.

[11] Charter of the United Nations, Chap XI, Art 73E (available online: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter).

[12] M. Hastings and S. Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands* (London: W. W. Norton, 1986), p. 82.

[13] A. Hope, "Soberanía y Descolonización de las Islas Malvinas (Falkland Islands)," *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review,* vol. VI, no. 2, 1983, p. 436.

[14] Cited in R. Dolzer, *The Territorial Status of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas): Past and Present* (New York: Oceana Publications, 1992), p. 297.

[15] R. Fisher et al., *Coping with International Conflict: A Systematic Approach to Influence in International Negotiation* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1997), pp. 119–121.

[16] Hastings and Jenkins, *Battle for the Falklands,* p. 23.

[17] Ibid., p. 22.

[18] Cited in Dolzer, *Territorial Status of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),* p. 298.

[19] Ibid.

[20] See Dolzer, *Territorial Status of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),* p. 305; and Hastings and Jenkins, *Battle for the Falklands,* pp. 31–32.

[21] Hastings and Jenkins, *Battle for the Falklands,* p. 32.

[22] Ibid.

[23] R. P. Shaw and Y. Wong, *Genetic Seeds of Warfare: Evolution, Nationalism, and Patriotism* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p. 168.

[24] G. Evans, *Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond* (Victoria, Australia: Allen & Unwin), 1993.

[25] I. Kittani, "Preventive Diplomacy and Peacemaking: The UN Experience," in O. Otunnu and M. Doyle, Eds., *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield), 1998, p. 89.

[26] D. Kinney, *Mediation Attempts in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands Crisis,* 1986, pp. 51–54, nn 51.

[27] M. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflict: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p. 40.

[28] Ibid., p. 42.

[29] See O. Cardoso, R. Kirschbaum, and E. van der Kooy, *Malvinas: La Trama Secreta,* 14th ed. (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Sudamericana-Planeta, 1984).

[30] Ibid., p. 55.

[31] Ibid., p. 57.

[32] Ibid., p. 55.

[33] Hastings and Jenkins, *Battle for the Falklands,* p. 45.

[34] K. Tunnicliff, "The United Nations and the Mediation of International Conflict" (Ph.D. diss., University of Iowa, 1984), abstract in *Dissertation Abstracts International,* vol. DAI-A 45/D9, Mar. 1985, pp. 166–167.

[35] Tunnicliff, "The United Nations and the Mediation of International Conflict," p. 167.

[36] Cardoso, Kirschbaum, and van der Kooy, *Malvinas,* p. 29.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Tunnicliff, "The United Nations and the Mediation of International Conflict," p. 169–170.

[39] C. Baker, "Multiple Alliance Commitments: The Role of the United States in the Falklands War" (Ph.D. diss., Howard University, 1984), p. 121.

[40] Ibid., pp. 128–131.

[41] XX Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Apr. 26, 1982, Washington, D.C., OEA/SER F.11/20 Doc. 28/82, rev. 3, corr. I, Resolution I, "Serious Situation in the South Atlantic."

[42] A. Bennett, *International Organizations: Principles and Issues*, 6th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995), p. 240.

[43] Cited in Ibid., p. 242.

[44] Baker, "Multiple Alliance Commitments," p. 172.

[45] Ibid., p. 167.

[46] Goebel, *Struggle for the Falkland Islands,* p. 360.

[47] United Nations, S/RES/502, Apr. 3, 1982.

[48] N. Serafino, "Mediation Attempts in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands Crisis," in D. Bendahmane and J. McDonald, Jr., Eds., *Perspectives on Negotiation: Four Case Studies and Interpretations* (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State, 1986), ch. 5, pp. 54–66.

[49] Tunnicliff, "The United Nations and the Mediation of International Conflict," p. 323.

[50] Ibid., pp. 34–35.

[51] Ibid., p. 36.

[52] Charter of the United Nations, Chap V, Art 24, Para 1.

[53] Tunnicliff, "The United Nations and the Mediation of International Conflict," p. 324.

[54] Ibid., p. 325.

[55] Hastings and Jenkins, *Battle for the Falklands,* p. 165.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid., pp. 325–326.

[58] Kittani, "Preventive Diplomacy and Peacemaking," p. 91.

[59] See, for example, I. Zartman, "Ripening Conflict, Ripe Moment, Formula, and Mediation," in *Perspectives on Negotiation: Four Case Studies and Interpretations,* ed. D. Bendahmane and J. McDonald, Jr. (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State, 1986), ch. 5, pp. 206–209.

[60] Hastings and Jenkins, *Battle for the Falklands,* p. 325.

[61] Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflict,* pp. 15–16.